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I.    PREAMBLE 
The United States Supreme Court’s freedom of speech jurisprudence—
whether applied in the public square or on campus—remains muddled.  
This confusion mirrors the fact that “[t]here are few hard and fast rules.”1  
The Court has called freedom of expression—verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors expressing a person or group’s opinion, point of view, or 
identity2—“the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom.”3  Channeling liberalism’s ideological ambitions, which 
specify that the right to liberty manifests itself as freedom of conscience and 
free speech, freedom of expression is seen by many as a moral and utilitarian 
right,4 a “constitutional lodestar” on which democracy itself is grounded.5  
Despite evidence that liberalism has failed,6 its foundational goals have 
 
* Director of Policy and Senior Counsel, The American Center for Law & Justice, Washington, 
D.C., and Distinguished Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law.  The author thanks 
Elizabeth McKay, Andrew Ekonomou, Stuart Roth, Jay Sekulow, and Robert Sedler for comments on 
earlier drafts.  Copyright © Harry G. Hutchison. 
1. Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Rise of the Viewpoint-Discrimination Principle, 72 SMU L. REV. F. 20, 
20 (2019) (showing prior restraints on, and prohibitions of, speech based on viewpoints were rarely 
permissible). 
2. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 22 (2017). 
3. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
4. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 67–74 (2004) (discussing John 
Stuart Mill, Austin, and Godwin). 
5. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech and Free Press, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 629, 629 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015). 
6. See generally PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 1–20 (2018) [hereinafter 
DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED] (explaining how “widespread anger and deepening discontent 
have arisen from the spreading realization that the vehicles of our liberation have become iron cages 
of our captivity”). 
2
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become inseparable from the belief that the quest for “freedom” qua 
“freedom,” when disconnected from the deliberate pursuit of the “good,”7 
advances the engine of human progress.8  In an age of religious and ethnic 
intolerance derived from movements founded on rival faiths that promise 
redemption for their followers,9 claims championing speech, however 
anagogical or allusive of secular salvation, spark the following three 
observations.  
First, rather than seeing freedom as a communal enterprise originating in 
the oikos, as part of “the belonging together of all things in the good,”10 the 
lonely pursuit of freedom disconnected from the “good” is seen as the 
reception of gifts from one’s self.  In this view, one’s self constitutes a 
random collection of molecules that tumble through the cosmos11 while 
pursuing liberation and gathering and cultivating experimental impulses.12  
Summoning a therapeutic sensibility, which conflates democracy with the 
“democratization of ‘self-esteem,’”13 the unconstrained pursuit of freedom, 
however indispensable, when severed from a connection to the good, may 
be metaphysically impoverished and philosophically “diabolical.”14  Second, 
as speech—epitomizing the transmutation of invisible thought—becomes 
 
7. For one conception of the “good,” see IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD  
94–95 (ARK Paperbacks 1985) (1970) (suggesting we are not really in doubt about the direction in 
which the good lies; it is that which every soul pursues and is the source of knowledge and truth). 
8. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the connection between 
government censorship and societal stagnation).  But see DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra 
note 6, at 43–63 (showing the pursuit of freedom, change, reform, and progress as part of the quest 
for liberal autonomy has resulted in titanic inequality, thus rendering this pursuit an illusion). 
9. See, e.g., MARY EBERSTADT, IT’S DANGEROUS TO BELIEVE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND ITS 
ENEMIES 2 (2016) (noting the rise of Nazism, communism, and totalitarianism).  
10. D. C. SCHINDLER, FREEDOM FROM REALITY: THE DIABOLICAL CHARACTER OF 
MODERN LIBERTY 9 (2017) (suggesting freedom, properly understood, has the symbolical sense of the 
belonging together of all things in the good). 
11. JAMES K. A. SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE: A REAL-WORLD 
SPIRITUALITY FOR RESTLESS HEARTS 75 (2019) [hereinafter SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT 
AUGUSTINE] (quoting Greta Gerwig’s film, Lady Bird (2017)). 
12. Harry G. Hutchison, Chasing Shadows: The Economic and Noneconomic Thrust of BDS, 1 INT’L 
COMPAR., POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 205, 227 (2018) [hereinafter Hutchison, Chasing Shadows] (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
13. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 6–7 (1995) [hereinafter LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES]. 
14. See, e.g., SCHINDLER, supra note 10, at 1–4 (noting the modern separation of freedom from 
the notion of the good signifies the flight from the classical to the medieval approaches and then to 
the modern period’s acceptance of unconstrained liberty, even though freedom must be understood in 
ontological terms cognizing the connection between freedom and the good and must see freedom in 
relation to the other as a vital component of freedom). 
3
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visible as it is shaped by a collection of molecular particles in a randomized 
pattern that is orthogonal to any organizing principle, it becomes central to 
unconstrained liberty and thus occupies a “preferred place”15 in the 
pantheon of constitutional jurisprudence.  
Third, the blossoming ontological separation of freedom from the pursuit 
of the “good” or, alternatively phrased, rituals representing “the caves and 
hollows of what had worked before,”16 has significant consequences.  For 
one, premised on the claim that judges have a “particular duty and special 
duty to exhibit courage in times of mass panic,” one can argue expressive 
communication should be given greater weight when balanced against 
reasons typically offered to suppress or punish speech.17  This inference 
gives rise to the assertion that “a commitment to civil liberty in general—
and the freedom of speech in particular—requires ‘civic courage’ of all 
government officials,”18 many of whom have attained membership in a new 
class of cosmopolitan professional elites.19  Membership in this new class, 
which includes academics, commentators, and judges who are fortified by 
their rising insularity, matches data showing political ideologies have lost 
touch with the ordinary concerns of citizens.20  Losing touch enables newly 
enfranchised elites—aptly referred to as “liberalocrats”21—to disconnect 
from the past22 and the notion of place,23 just as “cosmopolitan openness 
to the world is perfectly consistent with picking and choosing among the 
options you find” except those that are next door.24  Intoxicated by their 
 
15. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529–30 (1945). 
16. LESLIE JAMISON, THE RECOVERING: INTOXICATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 196–97 
(2018). 
17. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Clear and Present Dangers of the Clear and Present Danger Test: 
Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72 SMU L. REV. 415, 417 (2019) (footnotes omitted). 
18. Id. 
19. See LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 5–6 (explaining the rise of a new 
class of elite cosmopolitans in revolt against Middle America who have lost sight of the notion of 
home, patriotism, and the oikos, and replaced it with a “tourist’s view of the world”). 
20. Id. at 80. 
21. See DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 131–43 (describing the rise of the 
new aristocrats). 
22. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF 
DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 7 (2018) [hereinafter LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM]. 
23. See LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 5–6 (noting young people refuse 
to stay in, or return to, their hometowns and often perceive them as backward or old-fashioned). 
24. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF 
STRANGERS 5 (2006) (discussing the international lens through which various eighteenth and 
nineteenth century authors approached their work). 
4
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insulation from the common life,25 provoked elites engender a shift in 
plausibility structures fueled by contempt for earlier notions of patriotism, 
democracy, and the importance of the heartland.26  This shift authorizes 
them, as a new aristocracy of brains, to replace spurned ideas with 
cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and a “tourist’s view of the world”27 
that finds ethics and values in an atomized planet inhabited by strangers.28  
Predictably, cosmopolitan commentators, after elevating freedom of 
expression above other freedoms and goals, are equipped to “see the 
Enlightenment not simply as a secularist movement but as Epicurean, a 
modern retrieval of an ancient philosophy.”29  
This Epicurean flight from a common constellation of views and interests 
is emblematic of modernity’s struggle with memory, or rather its penchant 
for forgetting.30  This flight culminates in political, social, and cultural 
amnesia that yields compounding problems.31  This multiplicity of 
disturbances is attended by the birth of strange, ahistorical beings who are 
pastless, futureless, atomized, and born anew at every instant.32  A 
compound of disturbances arising from such utopian pursuits also gives rise 
to a Sisyphean challenge to rationality and reality.33  Multiplication quickens 
against a backdrop wherein modern elites insist on the perfectibility of man, 
nature, and society grounded in a trust in human ability and power, as part 
of a “belief in amelioration without limit, of mutability without telos, [and] 




25. See LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM, supra note 22, at 3–4 (explaining how people 
relentlessly take competitive individualism and the pursuit of happiness to their negative extremes). 
26. LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at  5–6. 
27. Id. 
28. APPIAH, supra note 24, at 155–74 (finding cosmopolitanism’s central concern is meeting the 
needs of strangers). 
29. N. T. Wright, Loving to Know, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2020), https://www.firstthings.com/ 
article/2020/02/loving-to-know [perma.cc/3TH5-4UHG]. 
30. PAUL CONNERTON, HOW MODERNITY FORGETS 1–2 (2009). 
31. See id. at 2 (discussing how younger generations have little relationship to the public past 
through diminished social mechanisms present in earlier generations). 
32. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM, supra note 22, at 11 (quoting Donald Bartheleme’s 
suggestion that Marivaudian beings have no sense of history). 
33. See, e.g., SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 38 (showing 
Sisyphean joy is predicated on the impossibility of arriving at a specific destination as modern man 
inhabits a universe divested of illusions leaving man an alien, a stranger in exile without memory and 
without hope of some promised land). 
34. PATRICK J. DENEEN, DEMOCRATIC FAITH, at xiv, 5 (2005). 
5
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Jews sharply contradicts this faith.35  
By fleeing common notions of language and values necessary to sustain 
reality and pursue true freedom36 and embracing narcissism and its 
accompanying depletion of the psyche made manifest by a devaluation of 
the past,37 elite commentators can ignore harm sprouting from the 
promised land of unconstrained freedom.  Issuing forth from the pursuit of 
unconstrained freedom inclusive of new possibilities and newly found 
interpretations of the First Amendment, unquenchable celebrations of 
expressions—which transgress the bounds of orthodoxy—surface.  
Consistent with this pursuit, it appears that “the overriding objective at all 
times should be to equip the [F]irst [A]mendment to do maximum service 
in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most 
prevalent[.]”38 
The intensifying crusade to embrace unorthodoxy as freedom’s atomistic 
and highest goal39 enables some to see campus speech freedom as  
“a fundamental American freedom and a human right, and there [is] no 
place that this right should be more valued and protected than America’s 
colleges and universities.40  A university exists to educate students and 
advance the frontiers of human knowledge, and does so by acting as a 
‘marketplace of ideas’ where ideas compete.”41  This competition-based and 
progress-infused42 aspiration provides a platform to defend maximum 
freedom of speech against countervailing efforts to fight students’  
 
35. RUTH R. WISSE, IF I AM NOT FOR MYSELF: THE LIBERAL BETRAYAL OF THE JEWS, at ix 
(1992) (discussing the desacralization of the Cathedral of St. Genevieve and repurposing it as a space 
dedicated to the fallen heroes of the French Revolution). 
36. Harry G. Hutchison, Affirmative Action: Between the Oikos and the Cosmos, 66 S.C.L. REV. 119, 
122 (2014) (internal citation omitted) (reviewing RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR. 
MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP AND WHY 
UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT (2012)) (suggesting any tempered discussion of affirmative action 
requires an agreement on basic facts, values, and an overall desire to pursue what is good and just). 
37. See, e.g., LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM, supra note 22, at 6–7 (discussing society’s 
lackadaisical view of history and narcissistic tendencies).  
38. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective, and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 
449–50 (1985). 
39. See, e.g., CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CIVILIZATION 269–84 (F. Stuart Chapin ed., 
1947) (demonstrating this shift is central to cultural, sociological, jurisprudential, and political 
developments, menacing the family and civilization). 
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marginalization43 in higher education’s domain.44  Countervailing 
endeavors include: (A) grappling with anti-Semitism as a form of harm to 
one’s racial or ethnic identity45 in a larger fight to preclude bigots from 
promoting racial, ethnic, and religious hatred,46 and (B) saving the West 
from its current crisis of meaning.47  Other countervailing efforts may be 
provoked by the suspicion that universities have a mission, which is not fully 
compatible with the exercise of unconstrained speech.48 
Part II introduces First Amendment doctrine, case law, and rules that 
may implicate public universities.  Part III examines the inception of 
modern First Amendment canons coupled with an often overlapping and 
speculative inspection of contemporary doctrinal innovations.  Modern 
analyses of free speech, whether sustainable or not, and whether 
unavoidably complex or not, are generated by, and interwoven with, the 
notion that speech instrumentally creates the conditions necessary for self-
rule within a republican form of government whose legitimacy depends on 
the consent of the governed.49  Later doctrinal innovations concentrated on 
further advancing freedom of speech rights.  These moves reflect the 
unraveling of classic conceptions of freedom of speech in favor of a virtually 
unlimited right to freedom of expression.  It also reflects a shrinkage of a 
 
43. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 656 (1999) (noting Title IX 
precludes the exclusion of any person, based on sex, “from participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits 
of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance” (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018))). 
44. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 153 (stating an “emphasis on free speech 
values is a ‘self-serving election’ away from efforts to fight racism, everyday exclusion, and the 
marginalization of underrepresented students in higher education”).  
45. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 837, 839 (2007) [hereinafter Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism] 
(arguing “anti-Semitic harassment at federally assisted programs and activities. . . constitutes racial 
discrimination prohibited by Title VI when sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive as 
to deny equal educational opportunities to Jewish students,” and indicating the Title VI’s prohibition 
on racial discrimination encompasses anti-Semitism to the same extent as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
46. See Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 55 (1985) (explaining how democracy in United States of America would suffer 
if bigots were prohibited from spewing hate on public forums).  
47. See generally Eric Cohen, The Message from Jerusalem, MOSAIC (Jan. 6, 2020),  
https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/history-ideas/2020/01/the-message-from-jerusalem/ discussing 
how “American society faces a deep crisis of meaning to which the city, and the idea, of Jerusalem has 
an answer . . . needed by Jews . . . and Christians”). 
48. Mission, supra note 40. 
49. See generally Laura Weinrib, Rethinking the Myth of the Modern First Amendment, in THE FREE 
SPEECH CENTURY 48 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019). 
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common view of democracy and self-government as a counterweight to 
speech claims that Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, and Judge Hand 
bequeathed to us.  This backdrop elevates a question originating from the 
work of one of America’s leading social critics, Professor Lasch: whether 
democracy, which is currently obsessed with rights and grievances rather 
than responsibilities and duty, deserves to survive.50  Such questions loom 
large over any analysis of liberty and freedom of speech within a 
constitutional republic.  These questions raise still another query: can an 
increasingly fractured and fissiparous nation recapture a common 
conception of democracy, a common language with which to settle disputes 
about democracy’s meaning, a consensus regarding the tenets of the 
First Amendment, and a commonplace understanding of the “good?”  
Part IV considers the application of the First Amendment doctrine within a 
university setting.  This analysis is complicated because universities are not 
necessarily public forums, may be subject to academic freedom rules, and 
pursue missions that are incompatible with the notion of a self-governing 
polity—a goal that has been foundational for First Amendment rules for 
decades.  Part V offers a conclusion. 
II.    INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment—even if it properly protects speech in the public 
square or on university campuses—does not protect every 
communication.51  Restrictions on expression can be justified when they 
countenance conduct threatening the peace and well-being of the State.52  
When expression vitiates a free and robust exchange of ideas or takes a 
racially defamatory form, which deforms democratic self-government,53 
expression may become indefensible.  Similarly, when speech is constitutive, 
for example, of anti-Semitic harassment, which cannot be defended on 
 
50. See generally LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 86–91 (showing 
democracy is threatened because Americans are too busy defending their rights while giving short shrift 
to responsibilities). 
51. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (discussing the limits on protected 
expression). 
52. See id. at 251–66 (explaining how the State has the power to punish utterances directed at a 
defined group, unless it can be said that such restriction is unrelated to the peace and well-being of the 
State); see also Lasson, supra note 46, at 36 (stating how only certain kinds of speech, such as political 
opinion, are fully protected). 
53. See Lasson, supra note 46, at 39 (suggesting racism becomes a substantive evil both to those 
directly targeted and indirectly to all other members of society). 
8
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either constitutional grounds or via academic freedom rules,54 claims that 
such expression is protected is unavailing.  Instead, surfacing from the 
history of extreme propaganda and the necessity of curbing “false or 
malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places 
and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to 
whom it is presented,” the State is compelled to act.55  Speech claims should 
be considered in a context that explores whether claims of protection are 
simply cover for discriminatory animus and behavior.  Context is particularly 
poignant within the arena of anti-Semitic activity because such conduct 
“remains a disturbing problem in American society.  Data show[s] that Jews 
consistently are the most likely of all religious groups to be victimized by 
incidents of hate and that such incidents are increasing at an alarming 
rate.”56  Campuses are not immune to this development.57  Indeed the 
number of Jewish students experiencing anti-Semitism on campuses across 
the United States rose to nearly 75%.58 
Despite the fact that (a) libelous utterances are not necessarily within the 
domain of constitutionally protected speech,59 (b) bigots have twisted the 
law into a weapon on which to launch a frontal attack on constitutive 
components of the republic,60 (c) a plausible distinction exists between 
speech per se and harassment, which rises to the level of discriminatory 
conduct,61 and (d) differences exist between private speech as opposed to 
government speech,62 often the defense of expansive freedom of speech 
 
54. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism, supra note 45, at 888–91. 
55. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261 (expressing how in the face of a history fraught with extreme 
religious and racial propaganda, it would be wrong to deny the legislature the opportunity to curb the 
actions of these groups). 
56. See, e.g., Mark Goldfeder, Why We Should Applaud Trump’s Executive Order on Anti-Semitism, 




59. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266–67 (limiting constitutional protections for libelous 
statements). 
60. See James Loeffler, An Abandoned Weapon in the Fight Against Hate Speech, ATLANTIC (June 16, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/lost-history-jews-and-civil-rights/5909 
29/ [https://perma.cc/96GB-U2W8] (observing university helplessness as “domestic extremist 
movements masquerade as a political cause”). 
61. See, e.g., Goldfeder, supra note 56 (explaining how speech is protected by the 
First Amendment, but discriminatory harassment is unprotected). 
62. Id. (noting the difference between private and government speech, a distinction which frees 
the government to reduce discrimination in certain context because the government does not engage 
in viewpoint discrimination violative of the First Amendment when it chooses to fund a program 
9
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claims, nonetheless advances.  Often it does so beneath a tympanic banner 
proclaiming “freedom of speech is essential to freedom of thought; it is 
essential to democratic self-government; and the alternative—government 
censorship and control of ideas—has always led to disaster.”63  Instead, 
expansive speech claims ignore contradictory evidence showing that free 
speech corresponds with its own share of disasters.64 
Free speech aspirations in the context of a university may be attached to 
the likely mistaken contention that public universities must be seen as public 
fora,65 and thus they are required to “accommodate all viewpoints, no 
matter how loathsome” they may be.66  Building and expanding upon the 
standard account of the origins of the modern conception of the 
First Amendment,67 these views advance despite the fact that the modern 
view, at its inception, was formulated to vindicate democracy as a collective 
enterprise.68  To be sure, this conception may have also supplied a platform 
for transformative political ideas and limited amounts of fuel to expand the 
constitutional protection of speech in the future.69  
Whether classic conceptions of the First Amendment should have 
substantial bearing on regulations promulgated by public universities or 
not,70 consideration of the vitality and provenance of free speech claims 
 
advancing permissible goals); see also id. (“[W]hen government speaks, it is not barred by the Free 
Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015))). 
63. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 23.  But see Lasson, supra note 46, at 55 (arguing 
punishing racial defamation despite freedom of speech claims to the contrary has not jeopardized 
liberty elsewhere). 
64. See infra Part III.A. 
65. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (explaining 
how the Court divided property into three categories: traditional public fora, dedicated public fora, and 
nonpublic fora, for purposes of assessing what type of regulation is proper under the circumstances).  
66. Chad Flanders, Are Universities Schools? The Case for Continuity in the Regulation of Student Speech, 
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 138 (2018). 
67. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 49, at 48–67 (disputing the standard view of the origins of the 
modern First Amendment). 
68. See, e.g., Vincent A. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule at the Birth of the Modern 
First Amendment, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY, supra note 49, at 13, 13–14 [hereinafter Blasi, Rights 
Skepticism and Majority Rule] (suggesting the First Amendment took on a more expansive meaning during 
the period of 1917–1919 under the leadership of Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, and Judge Hand). 
69. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 65. 
70. See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 66, at 138–39 (noting expansive First Amendment claims are 
built upon the appeal to cases dealing with true public forums (streets and parks) and rejecting most 
speech limitations at the university level and thus Supreme Court decisions on hate speech, fighting 
words, true threats, and incitement ought to control speech, rather than Court decisions dealing with 
educational institutions) (footnotes omitted). 
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implicating universities requires examining the inception of modern 
First Amendment doctrine.  In addition, an examination of contemporary 
doctrinal innovations ostensibly built upon this inception is warranted as a 
predicate for determining whether free speech rules apply to universities. 
The next section considers the emergence of the First Amendment doctrine. 
III.    FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Defining the First Amendment doctrine is a thorny enterprise.  
Complications arise because early Supreme Court precedents rarely gave 
content and substance to the First Amendment.71  Consistent with the 
Court’s intuition: “For over a century after the First Amendment was 
ratified in 1791, public officials regularly suppressed speech they regarded 
as threatening, blasphemous, antisocial, and even uncivil, and the judiciary 
rarely intervened.  Until the 1920s, the First Amendment was not considered 
binding on the states,”72 but then:  
[t]he [Supreme] Court . . . used the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate all 
of the First Amendment freedoms to be applicable to states and local 
governments.  Thus, the scope of First Amendment freedoms protect 
individuals from actions by local and state governments, as well as from 
actions by the federal government.73  
Under some circumstances, private persons or private legal entities may find 
that sufficient “state action” was exercised so that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments can be invoked as a constraint.74  Although the Court 
declined to “actively protect the freedom of speech until the end of the first 
quarter of the Twentieth Century,”75 the Justices eventually agreed that 
(A) government could not take sides against virtually any opinion and 
(B) most expressions of opinion were tolerable or even good, dependent on 
the judgment that the First Amendment should further the political value of 
self-government.76 
 
71. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1252 (8th  ed. 2010) 
(footnotes omitted); see also, Robert C. Post, The Classic First Amendment Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of 
Speech and the University, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY, supra note 49, at 106 (suggesting courts played 
a little role in protecting free speech before the 1930s). 
72. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 50. 
73. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1252. 
74. Id. at 1252 n.4. 
75. Id. at 1252. 
76. Post, supra note 71, at 106–07. 
11
Hutchison: Campus Free Speech in the Mirror of Rising Anti-Semitism
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
430 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:419 
These moves were advanced by interwar progressives who demanded 
state neutrality in economic disputes, believed expressive freedom was 
essential to bolster the exercise of state power,77 and judged the notion of 
individual autonomy hopelessly untenable during a period of rapid 
industrialization.78  Conservatives who believed that free speech could curb 
the state’s non-neutral meddling in business activities were also engaged in 
this effort.79  Consider one perspective on the initiation of the nation’s 
evolving First Amendment discourse followed by a discussion of inventive 
and innovative speech claims.  
A. Creating the First Amendment’s Modern Age  
On its traditional exposition,80 the First Amendment’s modern age was 
propelled by a “judicial triad” who included Judge Hand, Justice Holmes, 
and Justice Brandeis.81  They took pains to protect political dissenters’ 
speech without eviscerating majority rule claims82 and laid a foundation to 
cast expressive freedom as a central pillar of constitutional democracy.83  
To be sure, verdant possibilities have surfaced, showing the judicial triad’s 
understanding of democracy has been placed under contemporary stress.  
Stress surfaces regarding whether democratic governance deserves to 
survive America’s “disinclination to subordinate self-interest to the general 
will”84 as individual rights have been elevated at the expense of 
responsibility.85  Pessimism abounds as elections, once regarded as vehicles 
conveying legitimacy, “are increasingly regarded as evidence of an 
 
77. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 49. 
78. See id. at 51 (showing how labor activists attacked the notion of individual autonomy in the 
face of rapid industrialization, which led them to question whether workers could bargain individually 
for a living wage). 
79. Id. at 49. 
80. See id. at 48–49 (arguing the roots of free speech in the United States are more complicated 
than the mythical claims associated with the origins of the modern First Amendment and that the roots 
of free speech rights are both more radical and more conservative than the traditional account). 
81. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 13–14. 
82. Id. at 28. 
83. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 65. 
84. LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 213–14. 
85. See id. at 80–91 (raising questions regarding the viability of democracy because the growing 
insularity of elites vitiates formerly common notions including notions of reality as liberalocrats 
presume that democracy can dispense with civic virtue, while they act in ways that ensure that 
democratic institutions no longer guarantee a workable social or political order, while elevating 
individual rights at the expense of duty). 
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impregnably rigged system.”86  Abandoning for the moment the question 
of whether democracy deserves to survive, and the query whether autocracy 
led by liberalocrats deserves to thrive, an alternative view contends modern 
free speech arose on a non-mythological basis87 that was later “infused with 
an aspirational commitment to participatory democracy, minority rights, and 
peaceful social change.”88 
The propositional legitimacy of traditional expositions of the inception 
of the modern age of free speech was furthered by the discovery of 
foundational constructs that framed speech as a necessary vehicle that 
enhanced, rather than confined, the national experiment in republican 
governance.89  The scope of speech freedoms proffered by the judicial triad 
was “evaluated with attention to how the communicative activity at issue 
fits into the larger constitutional design founded on the principle of popular 
sovereignty”90 as opposed to a free-floating, putatively neutral, amorphous 
right that characterized later conceptions of the First Amendment.  
Landmark First Amendment decisions followed the triad’s evolving 
insights, which envisioned the courts’ proper jurisprudential task was to 
grant or deny “[First Amendment] claims with consistent emphasis on the 
question of democratic function.”91  Relying on constitutional scholar 
Vincent Blasi’s comprehensive analysis, this subsection provides an 
overview of the emergence of modern First Amendment doctrine, an event 
which later took a fateful turn toward the reification of individual autonomy.  
Although many contemporary observers believe speech freedoms “exist 
for the very purpose of countermanding [attempts by] zealous political 
majorities that . . . neglect the [counter]claims of dissenters,” the judicial 
triad—later celebrated as champions of free speech—entered this arena 
with great respect for majority rule and jurisprudence “that denied . . . 
natural rights and treated positive rights as exceptional, confined, and 
instrumental.”92  These judges—none of whom seemed predisposed to 
concede “that protecting dissent is most vital when the very survival of 
 
86. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 2. 
87. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 48–49 (arguing the modern free speech doctrine was sparked by 
interwar progressives who believed expressive freedom was essential to bolster the exercise of state 
power and to protect workers’ rights and by conservatives who embraced speech rights in order to 
curb state meddling with business activity). 
88. Id. at 65. 
89. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 28. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 13. 
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institutions . . . [were] at some risk”93—offered differing tests to properly 
examine free speech claims.  First, consider Judge Hand’s approach. 
1. Judge Hand’s Contribution 
Judge Hand’s analysis focused on discerning the meaning conveyed by 
expression rather than its literal meaning; concurrently, he measured the 
“predicted consequences of [speech] or speaker intent” as a way of testing 
its constitutional legitimacy.94  Hand pondered the exigency of “providing 
[speech with] a safe harbor” that would sufficiently secure democracy a 
minimum quantity of speech, thus enabling the formation of a majority of 
citizens to capture the nation’s mantle of authority.95  Hand’s formulation 
advanced the notion that all “opinion [is] tolerable, if not [necessarily] 
good,” and accordingly, speech should be subject to preclusive regulation 
only if it lacks any genuine value.96  This view concedes the possible 
repugnance, if not the falsity of some speech, “both the justification for 
protecting controversial speech and the limits to that protection depend on 
categorical judgments regarding which kinds of speech” advance democratic 
governance inclusive of a governing majority.97  Hand determined that 
“[w]ords are not only keys of persuasion, but the triggers to action,”98 thus 
justifying the prohibition of advocacy “counsel[ing] the violation of law” 
because it lacks any democratic function.99  Judge Hand’s approach coheres 
with the determination that “hostile criticism” is welcome when it serves a 
democratic function, but words conveying views incompatible with 
democracy could be constrained by the State.100  Hand drew a boundary 
between protected and unprotected speech that depended on the 
observation that speech’s primary function is to provide dialectical fuel for 
the creation rather than the diminution of the authority of the majority.101  
This determination neither supports a highly “individualistic notion of the 
 
93. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 17, at 417 n.8 (discussing the limitations of speech 
freedoms). 
94. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 15–16. 
95. Id. at 16. 
96. Id. at 16–17. 
97. Id. at 17–18. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 18. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 18–19. 
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First Amendment [later] favored by” some commentators,102 nor does it 
provide a basis for applying such a conception to university campuses. 
2. Justice Holmes’s Contribution 
Holmes solved the free speech puzzle by conceiving the freedom to speak 
as a beneficial “phenomenon that forces majority understanding and 
[propels society’s adaptation] to changing conditions.”103  Justice Holmes’s 
three best-known formulations were the “clear and present danger” test, the 
“limiting example of falsely shouting ‘Fire!’ in a theater and causing a panic,” 
and the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor.”104  In harmony with his book, 
The Common Law, these abstractions concluded that legal doctrine is about 
evolution and adaptation rather than ontological first principles.105  
Rejecting natural law and, by inference, natural rights and the notion that 
some truths are enduring, Holmes’s early decisions were propelled by 
“pragmatic[ and] consequentialist” considerations that uniformly found for 
regulators rather than free speech challengers.106  
Then came Holmes’s decision in Abrams v. United States,107 which was 
part of a series that presumably launched the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence.108  In Abrams, Justice Holmes noted, “when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct . . . .”109  Since the Constitution was not a repository of enduring 
principles, Holmes channeled his inner Epicurus and replaced deduction of 
what should “have happened from some antecedent dogmatic framework—
with induction . . . supposedly . . . [examining the evidence] without fear or 
favor.”110  This perspective viewed the Constitution as “an experiment, as 
 
102. See id. at 31 (observing how some justices favor a distinctively individualistic conception of 
the First Amendment). 
103. Id. at 19. 
104. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 17, at 427–30 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 
(1969) (per curiam)); see also Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 22 (discussing 
Holmes’s three best known formulations). 
105. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 19. 
106. See id. at 20–21 (showing Holmes, while sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, upheld a law prohibiting police officers from participating in political campaigns and 
later sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the convictions of dissenters under the Espionage Act 
of 1917 in three cases). 
107. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
108. Bloom, Jr., supra note 1, at 21. 
109. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
110. Wright, supra note 29. 
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all of life is an experiment.”111  Such views reflecting a “sharp 
distinction[,] . . . [a] divide famously characterized by G. E. Lessing as the 
‘broad and ugly ditch’ between the eternal truths of reason and the 
contingent truths of history”112 led inevitably to the following claim:  
If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for 
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought 
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.113 
This articulation coheres with the difficulty of reconciling the “‘eternal 
truths of reason,’ . . . with the messy . . . events in the world of space, time, 
and matter . . . .”114  On Professor Blasi’s account, this articulation does not 
necessarily signal a change of view by Holmes regarding the importance of 
free thought and speech or the “nature of rights and claims of majority 
rule.”115  Instead, Holmes’s “concern remained collective instrumental 
efficacy” and progress affixed to the perception that the best way to test the 
truthfulness of a claim is by examining its acceptance or lack thereof in the 
market’s rough and tumble competition.116  “Markets decentralize and 
privatize decision making, nonprescriptively honoring and implementing 
preferences and judgments of all sorts.  Markets reward participants who 
generate and master pertinent information.  They respond to changing 
conditions and lessons learned . . . .”117 
Holmes’s oration on the value of markets and the competition for ideas 
echoes his “interest in the work of Charles Darwin.”118  Parenthetically, as 
Schindler observes, “Darwin’s late modern interpretation of evolution 
stands as a ‘universal acid’:119 the inner logic . . . [of which] eats away at all 
other traditional ideas, . . . dissolv[ing] everything[, including orthodoxy,] in 
its wake,”120 thus providing space for future jurisprudential innovation.121  
 
111. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 22 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. 
at 630 (Holmes, J. dissenting)). 
112. Wright, supra note 29. 
113. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 22 (quoting United States v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
114. Wright, supra note 29. 
115. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 22. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 22–23. 
118. Id. at 23. 
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This is true even though Holmes’s views—emphasizing adaptation—largely 
served the majority rule rather than radical human autonomy isolated from 
the collective interest.122 
Later, the “clear and present danger” prong of Justice Holmes’s approach 
was undermined in “1969, when the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,123 glossed the test in such a way as to require both a direct call to 
serious unlawful action and a high probability that the call to arms would be 
heeded”124 before the government could sanction speech.125  Brandenburg 
gained additional salience because Justice Black indicated the “clear and 
present danger [test] should have no place in interpret[ing] the 
First Amendment.”126  Justice Douglas observed that “[t]he line between 
what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made 
impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt 
acts.”127  This signifies that pure speech should be “immune from 
prosecution” while raising the question of what constitutes “pure speech.”  
Although Douglas’ and Black’s ideas supply fuel for later efforts to 
accelerate the acceptance of expansive conceptions of freedom of speech, it 
appears that even after being drained of some of their force by later 
interpretations, Holmes’s more modest views favor the collective rather 
than the individual interest.  Taken as a whole, his views fail to support free 
speech maximalism in the public square or universities. 
3. Justice Brandeis’s Contribution 
Justice Brandeis solved the free speech issue by envisioning speech as an 
individual liberty, which was important as such but particularly for its 
contribution to society’s democratic character.128  “Brandeis’ concurring 
opinion in Whitney v. California,129 decided in 1927, contains his most 
intellectually ambitious account of the freedom of speech.  In modern 
First Amendment adjudication, duels occasionally break out among the 
Justices over whose position can best claim support from Brandeis’ 
 
122. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 24. 
123. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
124. Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 17, at 416. 
125. Id. (observing post-Brandenburg courts have applied the clear and present danger “test in a 
demanding fashion”). 
126. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
127. Id. at 456–57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
128. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 24. 
129. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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reasoning in Whitney.”130  Offering lyrical language while simultaneously 
proclaiming the mantle of principle, Brandeis noted that there is “a complex, 
interactive relationship between individual liberty and collective well-
being”131 which culminates in the following propositions: (a) “[t]hose who 
won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make 
men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary”;132 (b) those who won 
our freedom  “valued liberty both as an end, and as a means . . . [while also 
believing] that freedom to think [as you will and speak as you think] are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth”133; 
(c) the framers knew that order could not  
be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is 
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; 
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies;134 
and (d) “the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle 
of the American government.”135  
This syllogism supports the conclusion that “[o]rder, stable government, 
the path of safety, the fitting remedy, nonarbitrary resolution of 
differences—this is a catalog of the most important goods that governments 
are instituted to provide, and they all flow from the freedom of speech.”136  
Freedom and its corresponding goods, including stability rather than 
transgressive unorthodoxy, are generated by placing duties and 
responsibility on the polity.  Even though Brandeis saw liberty as an end in 
itself, individual choice or personal space—privacy, economic security, 
entrepreneurial opportunity—are prioritized for their capacity to advance 
“their contribution to the discharge of the duties of citizenship.”137  
Justice Brandeis contends that “‘the final end of the state’ is to ‘make [not 
 
130. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 24. 
131. Id. 




136. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 25. 
137. Id. at 26. 
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‘leave’] men free to develop [not ‘exercise’] their faculties.’”138  Likewise, 
proper government depends on developing its people’s character and the 
exercise of their duties, rather than the expansion of highly individuated 
human flourishing.139  Freedom of speech rests on its inherent democratic 
character, which is viewed as a public good because liberty is an essential 
component of proper political order.140  Brandeis’s analysis reinforces the 
State’s power to constrict speech grounded on the then-common 
understandings of the constituent units of a democracy.  
4. Fashioning Free Speech Doctrine: Barnette, Thornhill, and the Way 
Forward 
Judge Hand submits that legitimate speech boundaries are grounded in 
the conclusion that the primary function of speech is to provide fuel for the 
creation of a governing majority.141  Justice Holmes contends that the 
Constitution is not a repository of enduring principles but a framework for 
the deployment of experience and adaptation.142  Justice Brandeis observes 
that freedom of speech rests on its inherent democratic character as a public 
good necessary for political order.143  On the other hand, negative 
consequences for the value of speech mount in contradistinction to the 
judicial triad’s perspective when any of the following occurs:  first, when the 
communication at issue is directed toward an objective that is distinctly 
different from the establishment of a proper political order and the 
formation of the nation’s democratic character;  second, when common 
understandings of democracy are lost in the fog roused by the elevation of 
rights over duties and responsibility;  and third, when individual choice, 
personal space, and privacy are no longer to be prioritized for their 
contribution to the discharge of citizenship by politically equal individuals 
but for purposes of advancing unmoored individualism.  
The language offered by the judicial triad provides the First Amendment 
with additional heft, strengthening democracy and self-government as a 
result.144  Concurrently, the goal of a stronger democracy constitutes an 
 
138. Id. (quoting Justice Brandeis). 
139. Id. at 27. 
140. Id. at 25. 
141. Id. at 26–27. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 65 (discussing expressive freedom as a central pillar of 
constitutional democracy). 
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inherent constraint on speech rights.145  Still, skeptics challenge the capacity 
of the judicial triad’s approach to fashion an effective set of constitutional 
rules that infrangibly protect expression and strengthen self-government.146  
This presumed defect implicates the defensibility, language, trajectory, and 
future doctrinal developments tied to the judicial triad’s analysis. 
After the First Amendment’s unshackling, new risks, including risks to 
democracy, were instantiated once free speech doctrines were unleashed by 
evolutionary trends highlighted by Holmes’s capitulation to 
experimentation during the early part of the twentieth century, adaptation, 
and progress.147  Risks included the probability that free speech 
proponents, propelled by a radicalized conception of human autonomy, 
would pursue unconstrained speech beyond historically cognizable 
bounds.148  After all, the Court has struggled with tense questions such as 
whether highly expansive interpretations of freedom of speech could be 
attached to the moorings offered by the judicial triad and their intellectual 
heirs.  Answering such a question in the affirmative, “[i]n recent decades . . . 
some Justices, at times even a majority, have undertaken to conceptualize 
the First Amendment as embodying . . . a ‘distinctly individualistic’ notion 
of the freedom of speech, designedly independent of concerns relating to 
democratic function.’”149  Individualistic notions of freedom of expression, 
independent of any democratic function, were implicated by two of the 
Court’s most famous decisions in the 1940s.  Both Thornhill v. Alabama150 
and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette151 exemplify the 
electrifying tension between unconstrained free speech rights and individual 
duty and responsibility thought necessary to reclaim democracy. 
In Thornhill, the Court stated:  
Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and 
fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political 
and economic truth.  Noxious doctrines in those fields may be refuted and 
their evil averted by the courageous exercise of the right of free discussion.  
Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press, however, impairs those 
opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of 
 
145. Id. at 48. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 49. 
148. Id. 
149. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 29. 
150. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
151. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
20
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/4
  
2021] CAMPUS FREE SPEECH IN THE MIRROR OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM 439 
the power of correcting error through the processes of popular 
government.152 
At first blush, Thornhill’s formulation emphasizes the role speech plays in 
public education, thereby advancing democratic governance.153  This 
perspective is reconcilable to observations offered by the judicial triad.  
Simultaneously, Thornhill’s emphasis on the right of free discussion could 
also be reconciled with an evolving viewpoint, which reached its innovative 
apotheosis in Chemerinsky and Gillman’s recent contention that speech and 
ideas, however offensive,154 however hateful,155 deserve “broad 
protection: freedom of speech is essential to freedom of thought; it is 
essential to democratic self-government; and the alternative” is a recipe for 
a myriad of problems.156 
On the other hand, in Barnette, decided in 1943, the Supreme Court 
reemphasized that freedom of speech is not some free-floating right residing 
in the exclusive control of an individual.157  Instead, the Court stressed 
speech’s capacity to strengthen the polity.  Initially, of course, the Court’s 
analysis could be seen to favor the Chemerinsky and Gillman view.  For 
instance, the Barnette Court ruled that “compelling children to salute the flag 
and pledge their allegiance to it violates a right of self-determination in 
matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude.”158  
Justice Jackson suggests that authorities’ attempts to compel youths to 
embrace a majoritarian doctrine regarding patriotism and civic commitment 
may be illegitimate.159  He also asserted “[t]o believe that patriotism will not 
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a 
compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our 
institutions to free minds.”160  This initial analysis is consistent with the 
claim that some assertions in Barnette and Thornhill could advance free-
standing autonomy and the pursuit of unorthodoxy made tangible by “those 
 
152. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95. 
153. Id. 
154. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 19. 
155. Id. at 24 (discussing the principle of free thought and freedom, especially in regard to hate). 
156. Id. at 23. 
157. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black, J. & Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
158. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
159. Id. at 28–29. 
160. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (Black, J. & Douglass, J., concurring). 
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who insist on asserting their individuality against dominant opinion.”161  
Such a move could fuel an expansive conception of speech rights.  
Conversely, Justice Jackson indicated that the right of self-determination 
is a vehicle for “implementing the political community’s decision to ‘set up 
government by consent of the governed.’”162  Although liberals dismiss 
public opinion in favor of experimentation,163 the Barnette opinion trusts 
that a republican form of government grounds authority in public opinion 
rather than authority controlling public opinion.164  Hence, even though 
schools cannot impose public opinion, they can, consistent with their 
mission, educate the young for citizenship.165  Justice Jackson’s Barnette 
opinion thus furthers a moderate conception of speech rather than an 
expansive one.  On his account, free speech advances self-governing 
democracy and corresponds with the determination that an overriding 
objective can constrain free speech impulses.166  Barnette echoed the views 
the judicial triad conferred on us as they sought to expand constitutional 
protection for speech and set boundaries.  Congruence with boundaries 
emerges because the Barnette Court “conceiv[ed] of free and independent 
thought by individuals as both the starting point and the last line of defense 
of democratic governance.”167 
Taken together, Thornhill and Barnette confirm that modern 
First Amendment doctrine was unavoidably dependent, for its legitimacy, 
on the notion that freedom of speech has limits which waltz in tandem with 
the necessity of forming independent citizens for self-governance.  This 
approach coheres with early and mid-twentieth century Supreme Court 
decisions, emphasizing free speech in the context of the collective instead 
of judicial celebrations of individuals reveling in their disconnection from 
community and society.  Still, if the Court in Terminiello v. City of Chicago168 
was correct in its contention that the “function of free speech under our 
 
161. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 24. 
162. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 28. 
163. See, e.g., DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 143–48 (describing how 
contemporary liberals have become the heirs of the “[n]ineteenth-century architects of progressive 
liberalism,” who were propelled by an “imperative to liberate individuals from any arbitrary and 
unchosen relationships and remake the world into one in which those especially disposed to expressive 
individualism,” experimental living, and the rejection of public opinion).  
164. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. 
165. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 28. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 29. 
168. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
22
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/4
  
2021] CAMPUS FREE SPEECH IN THE MIRROR OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM 441 
system of government is to invite dispute,”169 it is likely that language can 
be found on which to establish future expansions of speech rights.  Partially 
consistent with this viewpoint, both Thornhill and Barnette offer some 
language supporting an expansive conception of the First Amendment that 
strains against the Court’s attempts to enunciate principles indicating the 
First Amendment is subject to enduring doctrinal limits.  
A richer understanding of free speech’s origin is informed by the 
destabilizing contributions of Professor Laura Weinrib, showing that the 
modern understanding of the First Amendment “was not reasoned from 
first principles.”170  Instead, it was “a compromise that served particular 
ends.”171  If true, the notion of a modern First Amendment conception has 
always had “its share of apostates.”172  Professor Weinrib undermines the 
salience of the judicial triad’s claims showing that the roots of modern free 
speech doctrine are both more radical and more conservative than Blasi and 
others suggest.173  Expansive doctrinal transmutation built upon the triad’s 
foundation has become a possibility for reasons extending beyond the fact 
that members of the judiciary are less susceptible to popular pressure than 
the political branches and hence can afford to be more imaginative.174  
Undeniably, more inventive justices have concluded that the 
First Amendment is a bundle of “free-floating” principles, facilitating the 
deduction that radical human autonomy “has become a versatile, 
noninstrumental justification for invalidating a wide variety of laws that 
regulate communicative activity.”175  This liberalizing maneuver verifies 
that as “the rationale for freedom of speech becomes noninstrumental, 
decisions no longer have to be justified in the manner of Hand, Holmes, 
and Brandeis—that is, with reference to past experience, empirically 
grounded predicted effects, specific and broadly recognized commitments, 
or coherent fit within a larger political or social design.”176  Blasi argues that 
abandoning these markers facilitates a “dangerously ipse dixit jurisprudence” 
even if “noninstrumental reasoning [does not] always ha[ve] th[is] 
 
169. Id. at 4. 
170. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 66. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 67. 
173. Id. at 48–67 (suggesting the roots of the modern approach to the First Amendment are 
both more radical and more than conservative than many have suggested). 
174. Id. at 48. 
175. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 29 (internal footnotes omitted). 
176. Id. 
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quality.”177  It also supplies a basis for standardless, free speech 
maximalism, as an offshoot of modern First Amendment doctrine.  
Free speech doctrinal innovations exist in tension with both classic and 
modern free speech ideas, but at the same time, Professor Blasi concedes 
that autonomy claims anchored in historical conceptions of natural rights, 
or carefully formulated ideals of self-authorship and personal responsibility 
could properly inform First Amendment jurisprudence if deployed in a 
disciplined manner.178  Hence, as a defender of a modest rendering of the 
judicial triad’s contributions, Blasi agrees that non-instrumental liberties 
have a place in American constitutional design.  On the other hand, he 
argues that the existence and range of such “intrinsic liberties must be 
construed with attention to how their recognition affects the instrumental 
liberties and prerogatives of self-governing citizens in a republic.”179  Such 
a construal would properly enable government to constrain freedom of 
speech claims that are not grounded in the prerogatives of self-governing 
citizens or consistent with the judicial triad’s perspective affirming that 
freedom of speech has a larger purpose than the self-satisfied expression of 
views.  On this account, expressions of disparate views are part of our 
collective pursuit of the truth that comes only “from the relentless, 
disinterested and critical student of facts.”180  Grounded in Brandeis’ 
analysis, Blasi argues that “the highest office in the land is ‘citizen,’” who 
neither exalts order at the cost of liberty, nor liberty at the cost of order.181  
Modern free speech doctrine commenced as a balanced canon that was 
hostile to the notion that fundamental rights could eclipse majoritarian 
preferences.182  As a result, the judicial triad was reluctant to deploy 
constitutional rights to invalidate rules passed by political majorities.183  
Although the triad “avoid[ed] recognizing a free-standing individual right of 
expressive liberty that exists apart from . . . the principle of majority rule,” 
and “despite that common ground, the theories embraced by the three differ 
radically from one another.”184  Nonetheless, reflecting a newly 




179. Id. at 31. 
180. Id. at 27 (quoting Judge Henry Friendly’s understanding of Justice Brandeis’s thought). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 13–14. 
183. Id. at 13. 
184. Id. at 14. 
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equate democracy with ‘the organized sway of public opinion,’” the Court 
effectively assumed that the government could not take sides against any 
opinion save that which expresses itself in the violation of the law.185  
Despite the Court’s reticence, it permitted a limited expansion of its 
conceptual foundation along the following three bases: (1) by conceiving 
freedom of speech as a majority-creating procedure rather than as an 
individual right;186 (2) by conceptualizing freedom of speech as a salutary 
phenomenon that forces majority understanding and is capable of adapting 
to changing conditions;187 and (3) by viewing freedom of speech as an 
individual liberty that is pivotal for its contribution to society’s democratic 
character rather than other values.188  Effectively, the judicial triad assigned 
speech a modest valuation in our republic.  
A modest valorization of expression signifies that speech is considered 
essential to the formation of public opinion and may be constitutionally 
protected under certain circumstances.189  Whereas speech, deemed 
irrelevant for the formation of public opinion, such as commercial 
advertising or the mere advancement of personal preferences, remains 
unprotected or subject to lesser protection because it is regarded as 
exogenous to discovering political and economic truth.190  Speech 
grounded in a sincere search for truth deserves protection because it is 
“necessary for the formation ‘of that public opinion which is the final source 
of government in a democratic state.’”191  Such claims remain vital despite 
evidence that the Supreme Court has “lost track of why the 
First Amendment” should protect speech and “has begun to apply 
First Amendment doctrine to all kinds of communication that have nothing 
to do with the formation of public opinion” and little to do with the pursuit 
of truth.192  Losing track enables the Court to see freedom of expression as 
a device that advances human autonomy by “serv[ing] . . . the needs of . . . 
the human spirit—a spirt that demands self-expression.”193  This allows the 
 
 
185. Post, supra note 71, at 106. 
186. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 14–15 (citing 
Judge Learned Hand). 
187. Id. at 19.  
188. Id. at 24. 
189. Post, supra note 71, at 107. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 109. 
193. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J. concurring). 
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individual “to realiz[e] . . . his . . . potentialit[y] as a human being.”194 
5. Questioning the Survival of the Liberal Conception of Speech in 
the Real World 
The aforementioned analysis provokes questions of whether modern free 
speech intuitions—building on lines supplied by Holmes, Hand, and 
Brandeis—can survive an inspection in the real world of praxis rather than 
the abstract world of philosophical speculation.  From the Left, 
Professor Weinrib gives a negative answer.195  She first observes that the 
triad’s work—whatever its intent may have been—has now been 
transmuted into a “liberal conception of free speech” that sustains its 
doctrinal chops by “shield[ing] unpopular speakers.”196  Thus, “in the 
interest of informed governance and pluralistic tolerance, [it] exposes the 
polity to unconventional and even dangerous ideas”;197 correspondingly, 
these moves goad the nation and perhaps universities to embrace 
unconstrained speech as the default rule.198  At the same time, the nation 
suffers from accelerating fragmentation because the two deeply divided 
precincts of America can agree on only two, or at most, three things: first, 
the polity, more than any other time in our history, is deeply and viciously 
divided; second, identity politics is among the most potent forces of our 
time;199 and third, perhaps, the “Who am I?” universal question has become 
tougher to answer given the great scattering, rooted in the evisceration of 
the family, thereby unearthing identity politics and exposing such doctrines 
to countervailing charges from conservatives and progressives alike.200  
 
194. Feldman, supra note 5, at 640. 
195. See generally Weinrib, supra note 49 (discussing these questions and her thoughts, answering 
in the negative). 
196. Id. at 48. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. (noting the strong defenses of free speech by Holmes, Hand, and Brandeis, 
persuaded the American public of the judiciary’s invaluable role in defending it). 
199. MARY EBERSTADT, PRIMAL SCREAMS: HOW THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION CREATED 
IDENTITY POLITICS 5 (2019) [hereinafter EBERSTADT, PRIMAL SCREAMS]. 
200. Mary Eberstadt, ‘The Great Scattering’: How Identity Panic Took Root in the Void Once Occupied 
by Family Life, QUILLETTE (Aug. 27, 2019), https://quillette.com/2019/08/27/the-great-scattering-
how-identity-panic-took-root-in-the-void-once-occupied-by-family-life/ [https://perma.cc/Y6S2-
NUC2] (showing while “conservatives excoriate [identity] politics as politically opportunistic 
theater[,] . . . [l]iberals and progressives put forth an opposing grievance-first narrative, arguing that 
identity politics emanates from authentic wounds,” concluding that both could be right, since identity 
panic is grounded in the implosion of family). 
26
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/4
  
2021] CAMPUS FREE SPEECH IN THE MIRROR OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM 445 
Against this backdrop, Professor Weinrib’s insights attain additional 
cogency.  Her analysis traverses the gap between theory and reality.  Weinrib 
shows the triad’s contributions, as a practical matter, may offer scant 
protection to disfavored groups even though members of the judiciary are 
“less susceptible to popular pressure than the political branches, [are better] 
equipped to balance liberty against security,” and are best able to evaluate 
the State’s justifications for suppression of expression.201  Instead of 
receiving coveted protection, Weinrib observes individuals and minority 
groups’ ability to exercise free speech rights as a core value, advancing their 
interest, is filled with more hurdles than many have imagined.202  Hurdles 
continue to multiply as legions of people unmoored from a sense of self and 
a sense of group and have reformulated themselves in identitarian tracks203 
comprised of fragmented groupings searching for ever-new heuristics. 
Professor Weinrib amplifies her claims by noting an unflinching 
commitment to the First Amendment, no matter how inventive, may  
prove inadequate and counterproductive.204  Observing limits to the 
willingness of men to use free speech, she notes that free speech may  
block democratic reform, may trigger the rise of demagogues, and  
“no kind of legal guaranty has ever been able to protect minorities from the 
hatreds and intolerances let loose when [a] . . . system breaks down.”205  
Such legal insufficiencies diminish the accomplishments of the judicial triad 
and their intellectual heirs.206  These insufficiencies also confirm 
transnational analysis showing that rivalrous individuals and groups 
endeavor to capture government for their own ends to the disadvantage of 
others, a maneuver harmonious with the fact that governments in liberal 
societies have become instruments of plunder rather than vehicles for 
 
 
201. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 48. 
202. See id. at 66–67 (describing the hurdles individuals and minorities face). 
203. See generally EBERSTADT, PRIMAL SCREAMS, supra note 199, at 5–16 (arguing the 1960s sex 
revolution is responsible for the destruction of traditional familial constructs resulting in many 
individuals, today, experiencing existential crises and focusing on themselves rather than a family 
community). 
204. Cf. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 66–67 (discussing how the “New Dealers” broke away from 
advocating for expansion of free speech doctrine to prevent judges from “block[ing] democratic 
reforms” necessary to keep the U.S. from “succumb[ing] to totalitarianism . . . [in] economic 
desperation”). 
205. See id. (quoting Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette Jr.). 
206. See id. at 66 (stating the consensus of the 20th century regarding the court’s preeminence 
in free speech protection is under attack). 
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ensuring civil peace.207  This further disfavors already disfavored groups. 
Equally apparent from the Right, Professor Deneen and others 
demonstrate the philosophical underpinnings of free speech as a leading 
component of negative freedom and liberal proceduralism—part of a 
consensus “grant[ing] . . . autonomous individual[s] . . . wide berth to define 
what is good and true”208—has produced its share of catastrophes.  The 
rhetorical potency of expansive free speech claims are inescapably fastened 
to the implosion of liberal proceduralism in the wake of more than a quarter 
of a century in which virtually all our grand narratives have collapsed.209  
This implosion is spurred on by the wreckage created by more than a 
century’s worth of efforts repudiating the reality of human nature and the 
adjuration of the world’s and the universe’s intelligibility, even though the 
opposite of such denials may be indispensable for asserting that the human 
person is free.210  This tsunami of debris denying reality unavoidably 
undermines the intelligibility and even the possibility of “free speech.”  
Together, these observations correspond with the onset of calamities for 
liberal societies. 
Calamities erupt, shrinking the value of free speech doctrines because 
these canons carry the Enlightenment and Lockean abstractions’ unwieldy 
baggage, which operate in tandem with contentions suggesting humans 
ought to be free from any command or consideration outside their own 
head.211  Hence, truth, as Holmes imagined, is subject to a gauntlet of 
rivalrous competition.212  But there is more because,  more likely than not, 
 
207. See JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 11–12 (1996) 
(discussing the shift in modern societies where individuals and governments place their own interest 
above the general public). 
208.  Sohrab Ahmari, Giving the Boot, in FIRST THINGS  47, 48–49 (Apr. 2019) (reviewing MAX 
BOOT, THE CORROSION OF CONSERVATISM: WHY I LEFT THE RIGHT (2018)). 
209. See DOUGLAS MURRAY, THE MADNESS OF CROWDS: GENDER, RACE AND IDENTITY  
1–2 (2019) (contending the explanations formerly provided by religion and then by political ideologies 
have collapsed leading to the formation of societies where people struggle for an “explanation for what 
we are doing here”). 
210. Robert A. Preston, Ideas Have Consequences Fifty Years Later, in STEPS TOWARD 
RESTORATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF RICHARD WEAVER’S IDEAS 46, 49 (Ted J. Smith 3d ed., 
1998) (showing the appeal to the intelligibility of the universe is grounded in philosophical realism, 
against nominalism (or empiricism, positivism, or materialism) holding only the individual is real). 
211. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 1 (demonstrating irrespective of 
whether its ideals could be actualized in the world outside our heads, this idea—liberalism—envisioned 
humans as “rights-bearing [abstractions] . . . who could fashion and pursue for themselves their own 
version of the good life”). 
212. LOUIS BETTY, WITHOUT GOD: MICHEL HOUELLEBECQ AND MATERIALIST 
HORROR 129 (2016). 
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after becoming intoxicated by developments from our postmodern era, the 
pursuit of truth has become extraneous; instead, it has been replaced by the 
demand for transgressive and unorthodox speech that is unmoored from 
anything approaching the notion of truth.213  Predictably, truth, as a 
describable entity, has become a casualty of the nation’s therapeutic shift 
wherein the pursuit of agreed-upon notions of truth and justice have been 
replaced with the electrifying quest for feelings.  As a result, the ostensible 
search for “justice” and truth has become indistinguishable from the 
grievance imperium, and masters of this new pursuit—made tangible, for 
example, by BDS advocacy—acquire moral power and propel human 
agency.214  Within this milieu, what masquerades as a quest for truth and 
justice becomes an agenda for corroborating one’s own biases,215 or as 
Heidegger clarifies, the acclaimed love of truth is simply convenience, which 
quickly turns to hate when truth presses individuals by undermining the 
facticity of their claims.216  Under a banner proclaiming freedom, progress, 
and societal perfection, truth claims become vacuous.  This void manifests 
itself in unimaginable devastation of every known form of association and 
every human construction as if the goal has always been deliberate 
deformation designed to ensure misery217 bolstered by the pathologies 
characterized by the formation of gulags and the loss of culture.218  
 
213. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 640 (showing freedom of expression has been 
transformed from a search for “truth” into a self-fulfillment device that enables the individual to 
choose her own message).  
214. Hutchison, Chasing Shadows, supra note 12, at 227. 
215. SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 144. 
216. Id. at 145 (quoting MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (trans. 
Matthias Fritisch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Frencei, 2004)). 
217. WISSE, supra note 35, at 176 (describing Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union). 
218. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 87–88.  Deneen shows that liberal 
proceduralism eliminates culture rooted in nature, time and place and thus conduces toward a 
questionable basis on which to organize society, leaving a huge space for “the rise of [the] Leviathan,” 
the ever-expanding regulatory state.  Id. at 82–88.  Since radical autonomy operates as a structural 
component of liberal proceduralism, individuals who are liberated from communal ties forego from 
communal and familial ties issuing forth from local markets and cultures and thus the pursuit of radical 
human autonomy, which leaves the individual more vulnerable thus elevating the state to judge 
conflicting claims.  Id. at 87–88.  Second, as vulnerable individuals rely ever-more on the Leviathan to 
protect them through ever-more government intervention, then the destruction of local cultures and 
norms (an orthodoxy) achieves not liberation but powerlessness culminating in a nonculture as 
liberalism parasitizes the original meaning of culture and replaces its meaning with a liberal simulacrum, 
which eviscerates actual culture that is replaced by government-enforced multiculturalism, becoming a 
mono-culture to which all must subscribe.  Id. at 88–90. 
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However speculative this analysis may be, the free pursuit of truth has 
been exchanged for the tight embrace of autonomy, allowing the individual 
to choose her own message premised on the human spirit’s whims.219  This 
signifies the constitutional protection of free expression220 as a search for 
“truth,” has taken flight from reality and transformed itself into protection 
for a less-than-serious contest between dueling speech claims.  This move 
produces evidence that Lockean liberty is frequently disassociated from 
contact with reality221 and is widely associated with repression.222  These 
observations achieve added poignancy because, for centuries, as Ruth Wisse 
notes, “Jews have put their faith in liberal ideas of progress, toleration, and 
secular democracy,”223 a faith that has failed them.224  In a world where 
tragedy and the shattering of shalom is the rule rather than the exception, it 
appears that unreality225 unsurprisingly infects liberalism’s unconstrained 
commitments to freedom of speech norms and unrestrained liberty itself.  
This counterfeit reality is laid bare because the absence of a commonplace 
conception or search for the truth, or a common pursuit of the “good,”226 
creates a fatal lacuna to intelligible conversation that advances democracy 
and human life.  
 
219. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 640 (“[T]he fundamental rule of [free speech doctrine is] 
a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”). 
220. Id. at 639–43 (examining First Amendment jurisprudence and its relation to the pursuit of 
truth in American life). 
221. SCHINDLER, supra note 10, at 185–88 (explaining the Supreme Court’s formulation of 
liberty originating in Planned Parenthood v. Casey). 
222. Ahmari, supra note 208, at 48–49 (reviewing MAX BOOT, THE CORROSION OF 
CONSERVATISM: WHY I LEFT THE RIGHT (2018)). 
223. The Liberal Betrayal of the Jews, JEWISH LEADERSHIP CONF., https://www.jewish 
leadershipconference.org/liberal-betrayal/ [https://perma.cc/E9SV-W6F6]. 
224. WISSE, supra note 35, at ix–xi (observing liberals’ belief in progress, rationality, freedom, 
cultural pluralism, and the rule of law failed to save the Jews of Europe from the Shoah and showing 
that while liberals were apparently not unsympathetic to Jews, they failed to protect them because the 
fate of the Jews called into question their deepest assumptions). 
225. EDWARD FESER, ARISTOTLE’S REVENGE: THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 16 (2019) (showing unreality likely surfaces because the 
unconstrained pursuit of freedom reflects the failure of liberalism’s proponents to abide by the 
distinction between actuality and potentiality, a crucial difference that limits the scope of individual 
freedom bounded by reality). 
226. SCHINDLER, supra note 10, at 1–10 (demonstrating modern liberals have separated the 
meaning of “freedom from a substantial notion of the good” and have turned freedom into a 
“substitute for the good”; a problem arising because freedom, properly construed, must see freedom 
primarily in ontological terms that both recognize the essential connection between freedom and the 
good and sees relations to the other as an intrinsic part of the meaning of freedom). 
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Deneen verifies the culture of freedom and human rights, grounded in 
“mythical Enlightenment premises” propelled by the pursuit of ontological 
individualism, produced a parade of horribles, leaving individuals subject to 
the arbitrary judgment of an ever-growing Leviathan.227  Freedom from all 
constraints inevitably culminates in human vulnerability, which is followed 
briskly by sharply rising government intervention (authoritarianism) 
designed to deal with this preordained development.228  As we become our 
own jailers and as increasing vulnerability crests in rising captivity, the 
populace is left desperately seeking a way out of the addictive crawlspace of 
self and its consequences.229  Verifying that liberalism has failed by 
succeeding through attainment of its actual objectives, we have become 
“increasingly separate, autonomous, nonrelational selves replete with rights 
and defined by our liberty, but insecure, powerless, afraid, and alone.”230  
This paradox, confirming that the pursuit of liberty has proven 
mythological, is corroborated by transnational evidence showing that there 
is a demon in democracy,231 evinced as liberalism transmutes itself into 
totalitarianism232 and as demonic acts multiply in the name of the good.  
Simultaneously, the narrow class of perpetrators of such acts (liberalocrats) 
falsify the notion of the good, allowing them to achieve more power while 
sweeping aside any sense that they are doing evil.233  Corresponding with 
the fact that the landscape of western democracies—including the United 
States—is littered by the debris of liberalism’s pursuit of unconstrained 
freedom,234 modern free speech norms predictably empower militants to 
 
227. Id. at 88–90. 
228. Id. 
229. SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 65–66. 
230. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 16. 
231. RYSZARD LEGUTKO, THE DEMON IN DEMOCRACY: TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATIONS IN 
FREE SOCIETIES 1–10 (Teresa Adelson trans., Encounter Books 2016) (2012). 
232. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 59–63 (showing totalitarianism rises 
out of the “discontents [produced by people’s] isolation and loneliness” as well as the state’s role in 
actively dissolving traditional human communities, including a vast web of intermediating human 
institutions; and further showing that the expansion of liberalism requires further state expansion to 
control a society without shared norms, practices and beliefs accompanied by the demand that state 
eviscerate all nonliberal forms of human support for human flourishing, a move which transforms 
liberalism into totalitarianism and thus reducing liberty). 
233. ALAIN BESANÇON, CENTURY OF HORRORS: COMMUNISM, NAZISM, AND THE 
UNIQUENESS OF THE SHOAH 14 (Ralph C. Hancock & Nathaniel H. Hancock trans., ISI Books 2007) 
(1998). 
234. First, this phenomenon constitutes liberal democracy’s attempt to resolve the 
contingencies of political life into the rigorous universality of a moral science, but it has not succeeded 
leaving them willing to settle for the “moral superiority” of authoritarianism and its accompanying 
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transform language from a means of communication between individuals 
who share differing, yet reconcilable values, into a vehicle that conceals an 
ideological impetus designed to conform the nation to a terrifying vision.235  
Unsurprisingly, liberalism’s dystopian wreckage includes rising anti-
Semitism.236  Nor have universities been spared developments along similar 
lines even if they have been spared the virulence and horrors of the 
twentieth century.237  
The salience of Professors Deneen’s and Weinrib’s irruptive accounts 
indicates that free speech doctrine, however revivified by language offered 
by the judicial triad, and however expanded by the contemporary embrace 
of unconstrained speech as the default rule, may be insufficiently equipped 
to enhance democracy.  Concurrently, free speech norms may be inadequate 
to shelter all citizens from harm.  
 
cruelty thus producing evil from the pursuit of the good that is narrowly defined by a narrow class of 
individuals.  See, e.g., Gary Saul Morson, How the Great Truth Dawned: On the Soviet Virtue of Cruelty,  
NEW CRITERION (Sept. 2019), https://newcriterion.com/issues/2019/9/how-the-great-truth-
dawned [https://perma.cc/6GYS-M3WD] (“All it takes is a sense of one’s own moral superiority for 
being on the right side; a theory that purports to explain everything; and—this is crucial—a principled 
refusal to see things from the point of view of one’s opponents or victims, lest on be tainted by their 
evil viewpoint.”).  Second, liberal democracies had to come to terms with the process of the repressive 
erasure of memory that arose in the twentieth century.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Kastner et al., Historical Amnesias: 
An Interview with Paul Connerton, Seven Types of Forgetting, CABINET MAG. (2011), 
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/42/kastner_najafi_connerton.php [https://perma.cc/64 
M2-A8CD] (“[Y]ou can say that there’s an ethics of memory at the end of the twentieth century in a 
way that I don’t think is there at the end of the nineteenth or eighteenth or seventeenth centuries, and 
that is precisely because totalitarian regimes engaged in such severe and punitive processes of repressive 
erasure in the twentieth century.”).  Third, this culminates in the invention of identity politics, as the 
power of grand narratives implodes, leaving the new religion of victimhood and social justice.  
MURRAY, supra note 209, at 245–52. 
235. Abe Greenwald, Victimhood Culture Leads to Anti-Semitism, COMMENT. (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/victimhood-culture-leads-to-anti-semitism/ 
[https://perma.cc/V453-AQAS].  Seduced by the spell of ideology, history shows the existence of free 
speech empowers militants to transform language from being a means of expression between 
individuals who share common but differing yet reconcilable values into a vehicle that conceals an 
ideological effort to force reality to conform to a particular vision of the world.  BESANÇON, supra 
note 233, at 14. 
236. BESANÇON, supra note 233, at 96 (evoking the terrifying ideologies that instantiated the 
horrors of Nazism, the Shoah, and sixty million dead as part of an optimistic program to impose 
national socialism and communism).   
237. Joshua Rhett Miller, US College Campuses Are “Hotbed” of Anti-Semitism, N.Y. POST  
(Apr. 24, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/04/24/us-college-campuses-are-hotbed-of-
anti-semitism/ [https://perma.cc/2SHU-ACXH] (suggesting the number of violent attacks on Jews 
on campus has been reduced but remains high). 
32
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 52 [2021], No. 2, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol52/iss2/4
  
2021] CAMPUS FREE SPEECH IN THE MIRROR OF RISING ANTI-SEMITISM 451 
B. Free Speech Rules and in an Era of Innovation 
1. Supreme Court Rules: Neutrality and Other Philosophic Difficulties  
Despite the rising tide of liberalism’s debris, when modern conceptions 
of free speech doctrine are applied to the public squares or college 
campuses,238 this application is often established on the proposition that 
citizens in their capacity as citizens operate within a marketplace of ideas; 
each citizen is endowed with an equal right to influence the direction and 
content of public opinion.239  This approach is tethered to the idea that all 
citizens are entitled to speak on matters of public concern including “the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”240  
Advanced by the allegation that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,”241 
free speech purportedly serves many ends, including “our democratic form 
of government,” and it achieves its inflection point in the contention that 
communication advances society’s pursuit of the truth.242  Whether the 
putative pursuit of the truth and democratic governance is compatible with 
the elevation of autonomy and unorthodoxy or not, this debate has been 
informed by First Amendment discourse, which “has taught us to regard 
freedom as a form of monadic . . . individualism.”243  Whether such views 
can come to terms with deep skepticism about the possibility of rights or 
not,244 attempts to enforce unrestricted speech rules hint that speech is an 
ultimate destination rather than an inferior way station.  Insistence on 
unconstrained speech and autonomy faces an inhospitable geography 
(reality) indicating this objective may be impossible to attain.  Irrespective 
of whether unrestricted speech, the pursuit of political neutrality, and the 
 
238. Post, supra note 71, at 114 (arguing academic freedom of teaching is not homologous with 
the classic First Amendment tradition). 
239. Id. at 116 (rejecting the marketplace of ideas approach to universities). 
240. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) 
(quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705. 714 (1977))). 
241. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S 624, 642 (1943) (internal emphasis omitted). 
242. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464. 
243. Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment 
Discourse, and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 183 (1990). 
244. See, e.g., BETTY, supra note 212, at 92 (quoting August Comte’s and Michel Houellebecq’s 
suspicion that in the absence of “a creator God to affirm them, rights are no more than a shaky human 
conception subject to the whims of history and human preference . . . [or] ‘arbitrary [human] wills’”). 
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elevation of autonomy should be enforceable, these goals are undergirded 
by the deduction that the “best remedy for speech we dislike is more 
speech.”245  Despite deepening disrespect for democratic self-
governance246 as the nation surrenders to elite/aristocratic control,247 two 
background conclusions manifest themselves as predicates to understanding 
Supreme Court rulemaking.  
First, freedom of speech rights, like all other constitutional rights, are not 
absolute.248  Speech rights are subordinate to the judgment that the ultimate 
liberty is not speech but the right to live in peace.249  This determination 
should call forth judicial modesty regarding efforts to further expand speech 
rights.  Second, in the wake of our collapsing metanarratives, the Supreme 
Court has assumed an expanded role for itself to act “neutrally” as our Chief 
Interpretation Officer to preside over a tournament of competing 
narratives,250 and to give content to citizens’ right to participate in the 
formation of public opinion.251 
Against this foreground, three essential rules—largely applicable to the 
public sphere—emerge.252  First, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may 
not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys . . . .  Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content 
discrimination.”253  Assessing what constitutes content discrimination is 
 
245. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 146 (citing Justice Brandeis). 
246. See LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 84–85 (showing elites ignore 
the conditions necessary for democracy and self-governance to survive); see also Jeff Guo, Washington’s 
‘Governing Elite’ Think Americans Are Morons, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/05/washingtons-governing-elite-actua 
lly-think-americans-are-morons/ [https://perma.cc/4WD7-RS6H] (exploring survey data finding 
“Washington’s bureaucrats have grown too dismissive of the people they are supposed to serve”). 
247. Monica Showalter, Democracy Dies in the Washington Post: WaPo Op-Ed Argues for Having Elites 
Decide Presidential Nominees, AM. THINKER (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/ 
2020/02/democracy_dies_in_the_washington_post_wapo_oped_argues_for_having_elites_decide_p
residential_nominees.html [https://perma.cc/7ECN-7226].  
248. See Lasson, supra note 46, at 53–54 (showing personal liberty is the degree to which it allows 
an individual to impose his speech on someone else and the deleterious effect his actions has on others 
because the ultimate liberty “is not freedom of speech but the right to live in peace secure from 
harassment” and hence certain kinds of speech can be restricted). 
249. Id. at 53–54 (showing liberties including speech can be restricted). 
250. Harry G. Hutchison, Agency Fees in the Mirror of Liberalism’s Contradictions, 38 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455588 [hereinafter 
Hutchison, Agency Fees]. 
251. Post, supra note 71, at 107. 
252. Id. 
253. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1254–55 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rectors & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–829 (1995)).  
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complicated.254  The Supreme Court has wrestled with various distinctions 
between content-based restrictions255 and viewpoint discrimination,256 all 
of which are tied to the deduction that “[a]ll of the clauses of the 
First Amendment” are connected “by the concept of freedom of belief.”257  
Although (a) freedom of belief is not explicitly written into the 
First Amendment itself,258 (b) as explained in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of University of Virginia,259 viewpoint discrimination is a subset of content 
discrimination,260 and (c) “[t]he Court’s concern with content 
discrimination predates the focus on viewpoint discrimination,”261 which 
“is a far more serious offense to freedom of speech than content 
discrimination”262 because one side is handicapped on the basis of what it 
can say.263  Still, the Supreme Court allows the government to “place 
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on speech without regard to 
content”264 despite the forecast that these regulations will have the 
incidental effect of limiting the amount of free expression in our society.265 
Second, the Supreme Court has been “vigilant to ensure that individual 
expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions” 
consistent with the deduction that “[t]he First Amendment recognizes no 
 
254. Id. at 1255. 
255. Id. at 1253 (noting the Court has determined that “content-based restrictions on speech 
are subject to strict scrutiny, whereas non-content-based restrictions are subject to a more lenient form 
of judicial review”).   
256. Id. at 1254 (noting the Court has never approved a government action punishing an 
individual merely on the basis that her view differs from the government’s viewpoint).  “Not all 
content-based punishment involves viewpoint-based punishment.  Yet all viewpoint-based punishment 
involves content-based punishment.”  Id. at 1254. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
260. Id. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content 
discrimination.”). 
261. Bloom, Jr., supra note 1, at 21. 
262. Id. at 25. 
263. Id. at 26.  In Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, a majority of the Court 
distinguished “regulation of content, which would be subject to strict scrutiny, from the regulation of 
viewpoint, which would be prohibited per se.” Id.  In 1986, in a four-Justice plurality opinion the Court 
“invalidated a regulation in part because it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint.”  Id. at 23 (footnotes 
omitted); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1254–55 (showing the closest the Court has 
come to upholding viewpoint discrimination was in Morse v. Frederick, a case allowing a public school 
to punish a student’s speech that was interpreted as encouraging drug use). 
264. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1255. 
265. Id.  Although, the Court will not rubber-stamp time, place, and manner regulations of 
speech, such regulations are not subject to the compelling interest test.  Id. 
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such thing as a ‘false’ idea.”266  Instead, coherent with Justice Holmes’s 
analysis, ideas must be tested by the market.267  
Third, a basic principle of the First Amendment is “that ‘freedom of 
speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must 
say.’ . . .  The essential thrust of the First Amendment prohibits improper 
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas.’”268  This principle 
suggests that government cannot enforce a hierarchy of ideas. 
Evidently, the Court incorporates these rules with regard “to the set of 
communicative acts judged necessary for the formation of public 
opinion”269 since the civil polity’s participation in the creation of public 
opinion sovereignly decides the nation’s destiny.270  Creating conditions 
necessary for public discourse rules out content discrimination to “[ensure] 
that persons set the agenda for government action rather than the reverse.  
The State cannot rule out topics or viewpoints that persons wish to place 
on the national agenda”271 harmonious with the inference that the equality 
of ideas permits every democratic citizen the equal right to influence public 
opinion to which the State responds.272  This largely Rawlsian view 
concedes “there are no experts: a philosopher has no more authority than 
other citizens.”273  Public opinion bows to “the equality of ideas flow[ing] 
from . . . political equality” as opposed to “epistemological equality,” which 
conflicts with notions of truth and falsity.274  Significantly, “the rule against 
compelled speech prevents coercion that would interfere with the ability of 
persons to imagine that the State is potentially responsive to them” because 
we cannot authorize the formation “of our own government if we are 
compelled to participate in the formation of public opinion in a manner that 
is contrary to our own will.”275 
 
266. Post, supra note 71, at 107–08 (quoting Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell 485 U.S. 46, 51 
(1988)). 
267. Id. at 108 (citing Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988)). 
268. Id. (emphasis added) (first quoting Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. 
570 U.S. 205, 213 (2013); and then citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 559 (1985)). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 109. 
271. Id. at 108. 
272. Id. 
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Irrespective of whether the state is responsive to the will of all citizens,276 
irrespective of whether all speech doctrines can be connected to the dawn 
of the modern age, and irrespective of whether such ideas culminate in 
disaster, newer understandings and extensions of Supreme Court views 
emerge.  These understandings may reflect opinions that are disconnected 
from the history of the First Amendment, the judicial triad’s emphasis on 
democratic legitimacy, and the creation of democratic character.  Despite 
appeals to judicial modesty, such views may legitimize efforts by 
contemporary elites who are pastless, futureless, atomized, “born anew at 
every instant,”277 and who exercise real power over and express “utter 
contempt for the citizens they” ostensibly serve.278  More likely than not, 
these moves advance First Amendment viewpoints, which elevate free 
speech’s non-instrumental capacity. 
Whether the Court’s speech intuitions stray from the judicial triad’s 
boundaries, it is increasingly commonplace to decline to acknowledge 
protection can be limited when the expression fails to contribute to public 
opinion as a collective enterprise but instead insatiably elevates individual 
agency.  Although declination does not fit within the framework established 
by the judicial triad, it is favored by cosmopolitan commentators.279  
Whether expansive free speech claims represent a new conception of the 
First Amendment without democratic limits or not, all enumerations of 
speech rules that build upon claims that the government’s power to sanction 
expression is constrained by an antidiscrimination principle, there are no 
false ideas, and authorities cannot tell citizens what to say, invite problems.  
Consider the following difficulties implicating freedom of expression within 
such intuitions, in an era wherein public opinion falls prey to manufactured 
consent, favoring the privileged.280 
First, the contention that there are no false ideas is self-evidently 
 
 
276. Evidence exists showing that this claim is implausible. See generally Guo, supra note 246 
(detailing evidence showing that this claim is implausible). 
277. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM, supra note 22, at 11. 
278. Guo, supra note 246. 
279. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 24–48 (expressing support for free speech 
maximalism); see also Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 30–32 (discussing Court 
views supporting a non-instrumentalist view of speech). 
280. See generally EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988) (showing the media defends the economic, 
social, and political agendas of privileged groups that dominate domestic society, the state, and the 
global order). 
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falsifiable, and it is haunted by its imaginary nature.281  Since the Court’s 
gnostic claim implies that truth is illusory, the force of this assertion could 
facilitate a re-configuration of truth by individuals and groups who have a 
predetermined agenda.282  Their agenda could terminate in a moral 
equivalence between the Golden Rule, for example, and the 
incomprehensible September massacres before things fell apart after the 
dawn of the French Revolution’s new age in 1792283 and efforts to deal 
with odious forms of authoritarianism that evoke the world’s halting efforts 
to deal with the dogs of doom, surfacing during the age of social 
catastrophe.284  The romance associated with the latter age remains alive as 
vast numbers of contemporary liberals persist in severing “the repressive 
policies of all actual Communist governments from the [unlikely] perfection 
of those that may yet exist in the future.”285 
What is more, the Supreme Court’s proclamation—that false ideas do not 
exist—becomes intertwined with a practical question: has the Court given 
observers a workable limiting principle with respect to the putatively neutral 
and equal citizen’s right to express their views however false they may be?  
Without a limiting principle or acknowledging not all claims are truthful in 
any cognizable sense, arguments multiply providing fertile ground to 
advance a limitless right of expression, and free speech rules become 
standardless.  This fosters the probability that no rules exist aside from 
claims issuing forth from a Nietzschean will to power.  
Second, difficult questions arise regarding the probability that the veneer 
of neutrality hides decision making that advances the preferences of the 
privileged and contradicts contentions that all citizens are equally free to 
influence and shape the formation of public opinion.286 These 
contradictions breed doubts, diminishing the plausibility of free speech 
 
281. Post, supra note 71, at 112–13. 
282. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
283. DAVID ANDRESS, THE TERROR: THE MERCILESS WAR FOR FREEDOM IN 
REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 110–15, 149–77, 116–48 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005) (describing the 
September massacres before things fell apart, the dawn of the French Revolution’s new age in 1792, 
and the new Jacobin age). 
284. See, e.g., ROBERT GELLATELY, LENIN, STALIN, AND HITLER: THE AGE OF SOCIAL 
CATASTROPHE 3–6 (2007) (showing how catastrophe enveloped Europe between 1914 and 1945; it 
was part of a continuous period upheaval, being that society was transformed by “two world wars, the 
Russian Revolution,” the Holocaust, and the rise and fall of the Third Reich). 
285. WISSE, supra note 35, at 183. 
286. Catharine A. MacKinnon, The First Amendment: An Equality Reading, in THE FREE SPEECH 
CENTURY, supra note 49, at 140, 141. 
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norms, and enforcing such norms may bolster inequality.287  Contradictions 
surface because speech hermeneutics lack a substantive notion of 
equality;288 additionally, paradox devours modern liberalism despite its 
capitulation to a Whig version of history culminating in liberty and 
progress.289  Paradox appears because liberalism, “[i]n contrast to its crueler 
competitor ideologies, . . . is more insidious: as an ideology, it pretends . . . 
neutrality, claiming no preference and denying any intention of shaping the 
souls under its rule.”290  Even though “liberalism promised to displace an 
old aristocracy in the name of liberty; yet as it eliminates every vestige of an 
old order, the heirs of their hopeful antiaristocratic forebears regard its 
replacement as a . . . more pernicious[] kind of aristocracy.”291  After 
leaving equality adrift, “[t]he liberties that liberalism was brought into being 
to protect—individual rights of conscience, religion, association, speech, 
and self-governance—are extensively compromised by the expansion of 
government activity into every area of life.”292  This is so because “[s]tatism 
enables individualism, [and] individualism demands statism.”293  Therefore, 
the liberalized state permeates civil society so much “the two are mostly 
indistinguishable.”294 
Neutrality, as a jurisprudential value, must confront additional problems, 
which deservedly expose it to deepening disrespect.  These particular 
difficulties arise because free speech rules originate from and are enforced 
by liberalocrats, our new ruling class.  Liberalocrats encompass a 
nonrepresentative and unaccountable cadre of consultants, bureaucrats and 
judges—including all the Justices of the Supreme Court295—who, through 
breeding, education, and training have separated themselves from the lives, 
and political concerns of common citizens.296  Judges’ isolation multiplies 
 
287. Id. 
288. Id. at 141–42. 
289. Murray N. Rothbard, The Progressive Theory of History, MISES INSTITUTE (Sept. 14, 2010), 
https://mises.org/library/progressive-theory-history [https://perma.cc/UD8K-T43C].  
290. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 5. 
291. Id. at 7. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 17. 
294. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND 
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD 154 (2010). 
295. Hutchison, Agency Fees, supra note 250, at 540. 
296. See DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 131–41 (showing elite 
universities engage in the educational equivalent of strip mining by identifying and enrolling students 
as part of two-tiered educational system that separates out the most talented students, teaching them 
the set of cooperative skills needed and thus replacing “one unequal and unjust system with another[,]” 
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neutrality’s conceptual and practical difficulties.  Troubles surface because 
the prevailing philosophic conceptions on which liberalism was formed, and 
then adopted by Article III courts, are not neutral.297  They emphasize 
abstract notions of equality, highly atomized understandings of the 
individual, and de-emphasize the pursuit of the “good” grounded in an 
originating social contract.298  Instead, liberalism pursues ideological goods, 
while pretending such goods originate behind a veil of ignorance.  
Complications compound because liberalocrats, as image bearers of 
liberalism, have chosen to live as innovators who “engage in experiments in 
living”, in non-conformity with the notion of public opinion—particularly 
opinion predicated on custom.299  They are driven by the epistemic belief 
that ordinary citizens—decidedly seen as “morons”300—must be controlled 
by experts and expert opinion.301  Against this backdrop, enforcement of 
speech norms requires action by judges, university administrators, and 
bureaucrats, whose educational background favors decision making that is 
drawn toward partiality advantaging the privileged,302 a trend that replaces 
“one unjust and unequal system with another,” even more insidious one, led 
by a new set of aristocrats.303  Within this framework, in the absence of an 
origination and grounding in neutrality, it becomes impossible to discover 
 
 
promising growth and goods to the lower classes, while elites reign as a new aristocracy that disdains 
public opinion).  Consistent with this analysis, all our current Justices’ educational profile fits Deneen’s 
description.  Id.; Hutchison, Agency Fees, supra note 250, at 540. 
297. See sources cited supra note 296. 
298. Id. 
299. See, e.g., DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 143–48 (describing how 
contemporary liberals have become the heirs of the nineteenth-century architects of progressive 
liberalism, who were propelled by an imperative to liberate individuals from arbitrary and unchosen 
relationships, and remake the world into one disposed to embrace expressive individualism, premised 
on experimental living and the outright rejection of public opinion). 
300. Guo, supra note 246. 
301. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 138–40 (describing the rise of a new 
aristocracy and the replacement “of one unequal and unjust system with another system enshrining 
inequality” through the promise of material advancement). 
302. Apparently, they are haunted by behaviors and beliefs they hold in common with rich 
elites, who “have far more in common with their counterparts in London, Paris, and Tokyo than with 
their fellow Americans.”  Mike Lofgren, Revolt of the Rich, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 27, 2012, 12:00 
AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/revolt-of-the-rich/ [https://perma.cc/9G 
5H-VBXH]. 
303. See DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 131–41 (demonstrating elite 
universities engage in the educational equivalent of strip-mining by identifying and enrolling students 
as part of a two-tiered educational system that separates out the most talented students and teaches 
them a set of cooperative skills, thus replacing “one unequal and unjust system with another”). 
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equally empowered citizens since the citizenry possess conflicting 
understandings of the good and unequal abilities to mold public opinion 
while their political concerns are undermined by decision making of the 
nation’s liberalocrats.304  This narrative unravels the thesis that robust free 
speech norms facilitate the formation of public opinion, while concurrently 
implying that citizen self-governance is an appealing illusion.  Instead of 
advancing the formation of public opinion via the equal contributions of all 
citizens, liberalism’s presumptions lend themselves to the mounting 
disadvantage of individuals who are marginalized and disfavored.305  
Disturbingly, evidence gathered from universities indicates that this group 
is disproportionately comprised of Jewish students.306 
However, many courts and commentators cling to the fable of 
neutrality.307  The prospect of attaining true neutrality is tempered because 
liberalocrats, including judges, enforce non-neutral assumptions rooted in 
liberalism’s foundational commitments, which include, among other things, 
J. S. Mill’s harm principle.308  Even though, from its inception, the harm 
principle has been unable to guarantee metaphysical neutrality309—and 
while liberalism’s quest for freedom and progress has been belied by the 
instantiation of titanic inequality310—liberalism’s proponents persist in 
defending liberalism’s distinctive commitments as deeply desirable goods in 
themselves.311  This defense lays bare declarations that such goods arise ex 
nihilo from disinterested humans in their original position and ignores the 
likelihood that liberalism, despite its initial success, concludes in 
serfdom.312  In fairness, we are all philosophical, if unacknowledged, heirs; 




304. See, e.g., id. at 5 (showing liberalism pretends neutrality). 
305. Hutchison, Agency Fees, supra note 250, at 102–03. 
306. See, e.g., Goldfeder, supra note 56 (indicating nearly 75% of Jewish students experience anti-
Semitism in the United States). 
307. See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
308. Id. 
309. Matthew Schmitz, An Informal Establishment, FIRST THINGS (May 2020), https://www.first 
things.com/article/2020/05/an-informal-establishment [https://perma.cc/P7E9-RXKK]. 
310. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 43–63. 
311. Goldfeder, supra note 56 (“Every person is free to say what they want, however abhorrent, 
about Jews and/or the Jewish state.”). 
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thus making it difficult to grasp the cloak of neutrality.313  Nonetheless, 
liberalism’s commitments, ideas, and goals, in the skillful hands of highly 
insulated and highly isolated commentators and judges, enable free speech 
rules to thrive under a banner of neutrality, when neither neutrality qua 
neutrality, nor democratic formation exist.314 
Uncritical devotion to abstract free speech conduces to two deficiencies:  
(1) it fails to generate “public opinion,” which commands the mantle of 
authority, and (2) it tends to systematically protect non-neutral speech while 
promoting social and political inequality.315  Because such undeniable 
deficiencies afflict doctrines surfacing from the modern age of the 
First Amendment and its intellectual offspring, courts and universities 
should keep such inadequacies in mind before credulously enforcing free 
speech norms and principles on university campuses and elsewhere.    
2. Separating Speech from Conduct  
Before pressing ahead, it is useful to consider whether speech can be 
separated from conduct.  Courts must solve this constitutional quandary: 
What speech falls “within ‘the freedom of speech that the Constitution 
protects’”?316  Such questions achieve contemporary prominence within 
the realm of anti-Semitism because advocates of the BDS movement deploy 
speech, however deceptive, to delegitimize Israel through Holocaust 
inversion techniques.317  These techniques are driven by false claims, which 
are based on an imaginative aristocracy of grievances entwined with 




313. SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 20. 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 299–311. 
315. MacKinnon, supra note 286, at 142. 
316. Frederick Schauer, Every Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY, supra 
note 49, at 33. 
317. Mary Margaret Olohan, BDS Movement Uses Holocaust Inversion to Delegitimize Israel, Israeli 
Government Report Finds, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 18, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://dailycaller.com/2019/ 
10/18/bds-movement-report-israel-government/ [https://perma.cc/Q8ZS-NMV9] (showing a link 
between discourse and violence as BDS advocates intentionally use Holocaust inversion, the portrayal 
of Jews and Israel as Nazis, to create “an inverted reality where Israelis are the new ‘Nazis’ and 
Palestinians the new ‘Jews,’ and an inverted moral construct in which the Holocaust serves as a moral 
lesson for, and a moral indictment of, the Jewish State”).  BDS may be indistinguishable from anti-
Semitism.  Id. 
318. Hutchison, Chasing Shadows, supra note 12, at 217–28 (describing the deceptive creation of 
an aristocracy of grievance during our emotive age). 
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complex moves impel a “global surge in Jew-hatred” and are abetted by 
apathy climaxing in oppression by indifference.319  Neither the public 
square nor universities are immune from these toxins.  It is therefore 
important to separate presumably protected speech from conduct, while 
concurrently challenging Justice Douglas’s intuition that pure speech may 
be immune from limitation.320  Instead, courts should carefully interrogate 
institutions about their contentions, including universities when they engage 
in an unbalanced and uncontextualized application of free speech norms 
that disfavors targeted students.321  
This debate reinforces the necessity of appraising speech questions with 
analytical skepticism regarding the presumptive appeal of liberalism’s 
foundational claims.  Arguably, any evaluation should be grounded in an 
affirmative response to the proposition that speech should nurture rather 
than shred communal bonds and should heal rather than spread hatred 
within our society.  This observation corresponds with (a) Justice Brandeis’s 
claim that hate operates as a destabilizing force in society,322 (b) Professor 
Weinrib’s admonition that unconstrained speech may trigger the rise of 
demagogues and fail to protect minorities when the system breaks down,323 
(c) the possibility that libelous utterances should not be constitutionally 
protected,324 and (d) an analytical distinction that exists between speech per 
se and harassment rising to the level of discriminatory conduct.325  These 
reflections—emphasizing the necessity of reclaiming space for the notion 
of the “good”—remain defensible even if courts and universities must 
entertain a principled debate on where limits should be placed.  
The question remains whether free speech rules should be viewed as 
tenable on university campuses.  Clarity may be difficult, but the next section 
offers one view of the cathedral. 
 
319. Bari Weiss, Inconvenient Murders, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/12/05/opinion/politics/antisemitism-europe-corbyn.html [https://perma.cc/8U2L-23FY].  
320. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44, 456–57 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (per curiam). 
321. For a discussion of contextualization, see infra Part IV.B.4. 
322. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
323. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 67. 
324. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266–67 (1952). 
325. See, e.g., Goldfeder, supra note 56 (observing speech is protected by the First Amendment, 
but “discriminatory harassment, with or without accompanying acts,” is not protected). 
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IV.    FREE SPEECH WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY? 
A. Prolegomenon326 
Systematic analysis of university speech rules challenges the applicability 
of the Supreme Court’s three speech rules and the force of the judicial triad’s 
ideas.  The triad’s views, and those of Holmes in particular, fairly provide 
scope for innovation and invention.327  After all, he was consumed with the 
notion of adaptation that “demands the redirection of inquisitive energy . . . 
stimulated by competition over ideas . . . [while overcoming] the forces of 
custom and inertia” and tradition.328  Holmes’s free speech observations 
tethered to the inevitability of human progress provide a mushrooming 
platform for advancing the innovative jurisprudential assumptions of 
contemporary liberalocrats who are the presumptive intellectual heirs of 
Locke’s economic liberalism and Mill’s lifestyle liberalism.329  This 
conclusion remains vivid despite liberalism’s intellectual and political 
bankruptcy.330  Bankruptcy becomes evident for numerous reasons 
including that an assessment of the “nature of anti-Semitism makes it 
impossible to believe in the progressive improvement of humankind 
without obscuring evidence of the Jews. . . . [and] their progressive 
demoralization . . . .”331  Notwithstanding the onset of bankruptcy, and the 
fact that “classical liberalism has been in decline for more than a century”332 
as it diverges from reality and trends toward obsolescence,333 liberalism’s 
evolving insights furnish an ideological basis, which allows Holmes’s heirs 
to pursue an unconstrained view of negative freedom and emphasize non-
instrumental liberties.  
 
326. “[A] formal essay or critical discussion serving to introduce and interpret an extended 
work.  Prolegomenon, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prolegom 
enon [https://perma.cc/9SNL-TJQH]. 
327. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 23. 
328. Id. 
329. See generally DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED, supra note 6, at 144–61 (describing 
liberalocracy’s ascendance as a new ruling class of self-made individuals who have been freed from 
accident, circumstances, and custom to live experimental lives, accompanied by the belief that ordinary 
people must be controlled by experts and expert opinion because they lack the expertise necessary to 
control their own lives). 
330. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM, supra note 22, at 2. 
331. WISSE, supra note 35, at x. 
332. HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, DEMOCRACY: THE GOD THAT FAILED 221 (2001). 
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On the other hand, the judicial triad’s speech rules were initiated to 
advance self-government by the polity whereas “speech within universities 
does not serve this purpose.  It serves the purpose of education, which 
[likely] requires an entirely different framework of speech regulation and 
protection.”334  Professor Post demonstrates that university 
communications are  “ordinarily protected according to principles of 
academic freedom as distinct from freedom of speech.”335  Hence, it is 
misleading when those arguing in favor of a maximum free speech view say 
their position is rooted in doctrine.336  In reality, such assertions are 
anchored in a normative ideal of what should happen within a university’s 
boundaries.337  The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to 
speak as individual members of the polity in a public forum, in 
contradistinction to freedom of inquiry rules governing “disciplinary 
communities,” permitting them to “develop autonomously according to 
their own internal logic.”338 
Against these claims, numerous queries arise including:  
(1) Is the scope of academic freedom in the classroom determined by the 
First Amendment?   
(2) Can a university regulate speech based on its substantive content or 
the message conveyed?   
(3) Must all individual expressions within a university be free from 
university sanction? 
(4) Is there such a thing as a false idea within the domain of a university? 
(5) Can universities impose non-neutral constraints on the expression of 
ideas? 
As an initial matter, the scope of academic freedom in the classroom is 
not determined by the First Amendment.339  The freedom of professors is 
determined by their competence, and their teaching must cohere with the 
 
334. Post, supra note 71, at 112. 
335. Id. 
336. Bee Flanders, supra note 66, at 138 (“[T]he overall impression is that public universities are 
required to host and accommodate all viewpoints, . . .  There is reason to take this position seriously.” 
337. Id. (reiterating the commonly held belief public universities must allow all viewpoints to be 
heard to avoid “running afoul of the First Amendment”). 
338. Post, supra note 71, at 117. 
339. Id. at 113 (stating instead it is determined “by the requirements of professional 
competence”). 
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educational mission of a university.340  This freedom is inclusive of the 
“freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion[,] and of teaching,” but not 
absolute freedom of utterance.341  Similar and broader constraints apply to 
students since student “communication is not about influencing public 
opinion.”  Instead, they are tasked with learning, and “their speech may be 
regulated in ways that facilitate their education.”342 
These preliminary answers achieve prominence because 
First Amendment principles do not govern most campus disputes despite 
the fact that “Americans have enjoyed a robust civic culture . . . celebrat[ing] 
freedom of expression” for quite some time.343  Within a university’s 
research realm,344 the marketplace of ideas metaphor is inapplicable345 
because the marketplace is incompatible with the objective of freedom of 
inquiry designed to create expert knowledge within disciplines.346 
University speech does not proceed along the pathway blazed by either 
the judicial triad or their contemporary heirs, leaving the First Amendment 
rather useless for purposes of solving most campus disputes.  Neither a 
university’s educational objectives nor its normative goals are directed 
toward influencing public opinion, but rather advancing expert knowledge 
and educating students.  Students acting within or outside of a classroom 
while on a university campus are unlikely to be acting as sovereign agents of 
self-government like citizens within a republican form of government.347  
Accordingly, if the judicial triad’s analysis retains its persuasive power, 
universities can (1) regulate speech based on its substantive content; 
(2) sanction individual expression under certain circumstances; (3) permit 
false ideas—consistent with the hierarchical claims disciplines make; 
(4) impose non-neutral constraints on expression within the realm of their 
 
340. Id. 
341. Id. at 117. 
342. Id. at 112. 
343. Id. at 106. 
344. See id. at 115 (noting participation in an academic discipline means being subject to 
criticism by members of the discipline and thus the institution’s freedom of inquiry rules rather than 
First Amendment rules apply). 
345. See id. (exhibiting the distinction between the freedom of inquiry characteristic observed in 
the First Amendment tradition of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas as opposed to a university 
setting). 
346. See id. at 115–16 (explaining how disciplines cannot create expert knowledge through 
prohibiting content discrimination, as “[d]isciplines are grounded on the premise that some ideas are 
better than others”). 
347. See id. at 112 (describing how students expressing themselves in the classroom are not 
acting as sovereign agents of self-government). 
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control—consistent with the fact that students and faculty must understand 
not all ideas are equal on campus; and (5) compel students to engage in 
certain speech.348  Additionally, “no competent teacher would permit a 
class to descend into name-calling and insults”349—a determination that 
implies classrooms are not defensible venues for libelous utterances.  While 
“students have a [First Amendment] right to petition the administration for 
redress of their grievances[,] . . . the institution is under no obligation to 
respond.”350 
Federal courts persuaded by the judicial triad should carefully interrogate 
claims that most university arenas implicate the First Amendment, despite 
seemingly definitive statements by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), such as:  
Restrictions on speech by public colleges and universities amount to 
government censorship, in violation of the Constitution.  Such restrictions 
deprive students of their right to invite speech they wish to hear, debate 
speech with which they disagree, and protest speech they find bigoted or 
offensive.  An open society depends on liberal education, and the whole 
enterprise of liberal education is founded on the principle of free speech.351 
This claim—perceiving public universities as public forums rather than 
schools and confusing an open society with a university—flounders because 
universities are not public forums but schools operating within a definable 
hierarchy of values.352  This remains true even though faculty and students, 
as part of students’ training program are “‘free . . . to express the widest 
range of viewpoints in accord with the standards of scholarly inquiry[, 
academic freedom], and professional ethics.’”353  Contrary to 
First Amendment rules precluding governments from enforcing a hierarchy 
of ideas, universities—consistent with academic freedom norms—can and 
must enforce a pecking order.354  Confusion rather than clarity abounds 
 
348. See id. at 115 (discussing how universities exercise content and viewpoint discrimination 
and compel speech based on an inequality to advance expert knowledge and education). 
349. Id. at 113. 
350. Josh Blackman, #Heckled, 18 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2019).  
351. Speech on Campus, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus [https://perma.cc/ 
X5Y3-L3FT].  
352. Post, supra note 71, at 115 (noting while public discourse “postulates the democratic 
equality of all citizens, [academic] disciplines are inherently hierarchical”). 
353. Id. at 113 (omission in original)). 
354. Cf. id. at 117 (discussing the significant distinction created by scholastic fora and how 
universities react as a result). 
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when “the educational or research functions of a university are neither 
salient nor well theorized.”355  This gap signifies that some areas are not 
amenable to the application of academic freedom rules, thus providing 
scope for a dispute regarding which rules reign.356  
In fairness, some argue that campus free speech controversies can be 
understood only within “the context of the history of free speech”, which 
is in turn “inseparable from the First Amendment.”357  Free speech 
maximalists assert that freedom of speech is an “indispensable condition[] 
of nearly every other form of freedom.”358  First Amendment lawyer Floyd 
Abrams argues that universities have become centers of intolerance.359  He 
observes: “[T]he single greatest threat facing free speech today ‘come[s] 
from a minority of students, who strenuously . . . disapprove of the views 
of speakers whose view of the world is different from theirs and who seek 
to prevent those views from being heard.’”360  Disputing such claims, 
Professor Robert Post shows there are good reasons to limit speech in many 
cases361 despite the observation that freedom of speech norms are under 
threat for a variety of reasons.362  In reality, “the best way to look at 
university First Amendment case[s], is not by treating universities as akin to 
public forums, but by treating them as schools”363 with an educational and 
research mission safeguarded by academic freedom rather than Supreme 
Court case law.  Still, doubt rather than clarity reigns because there is little 
“agreement on what function free speech should serve,”364 little agreement 
 
355. Id. 
356. See id. (demonstrating a lack of clarity on how academic freedom rules apply to outside 
speakers).  But see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823, 830–32 
(1995) (deploying the anti-viewpoint discrimination principle and refraining from examining the 
university’s motivation to invalidate a university regulation that prohibited reimbursement of expenses 
to a student newspaper that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity 
or an ultimate reality” (alteration in original)). 
357. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 22. 
358. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
359. Thomas Healy, Return of the Campus Speech Wars, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2019) 
(second alteration in original). 
360. Id. (quoting Ronald K. L. Collins, Guest Contributor—Floyd Abrams, “Liberty is Liberty,” 
CONCURRING OPS. (Mar. 18, 2015), [https://perma.cc/RXN6-AJ76]). 
361. See Post, supra note 71, at 112–13 (providing classroom examples where regulation is 
warranted and even beneficial). 
362. Mission, supra note 40. 
363. Flanders, supra note 66, at 157 (emphasis in original). 
364. Weinrib, supra note 49, at 65. 
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regarding the purpose and proper conception of the university itself,365 or 
agreement regarding education’s end.366  
Despite this foreground, which indicates speech can be restricted, and 
First Amendment canons are largely inapplicable to universities, contrary 
claims reappear.  The next two subsections respond by examining specific 
hurdles and issues impinging on the plausibility of applying free speech 
norms to public universities followed by closing observations in 
subsection D. 
B. Specific Hurdles and Issues on the Road to University Speech Norms 
Persistent contentions that Supreme Court precedent leaves little “room 
for the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply with less 
force on college campuses than in the community at large”367 remain 
credulous because the Court has never ruled that its public school 
decisions—Tinker,368 Hazelwood,369 Fraser,370 and Morse371—are limited 
only to schools as opposed to universities.372 Hence, the ACLU cannot 
substantiate its insistence that campuses must agree that “[s]peech that 
deeply offends our morality or is hostile to our way of life warrants the same 
constitutional protection as other speech because the right of free speech is 
indivisible.”373  While it is possible to distinguish cases involving university 
students and public school students in certain contexts,374 as we shall see, 
several issues and hurdles encroach on the promise of unconstrained 
freedom of speech on campus, including: academic freedom norms, 
 
365. Flanders, supra note 66, at 142 (suggesting a maximalist conception of free speech for 
universities wrongly conceives them as public fora, cultivating a free-wheeling ethos separating 
universities from public schools).  
366. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, EDUCATION’S END: WHY OUR COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES HAVE GIVEN UP ON THE MEANING OF LIFE (2007) (contending higher education 
should focus on the meaning of life). 
367. Flanders, supra note 66, at 139. 
368. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
369. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
370. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
371. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
372. Flanders, supra note 66, at 139–40. 
373. Speech on Campus, supra note 347. 
374. See, e.g., Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985–86 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing elementary 
and middle-school-aged children from university students for purposes of invocations deciding 
coercion and endorsement within the meaning of the Establishment clause as defined by the Lemon 
test). 
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harassment rules, and the inventive formation of social justice groupings, as 
well as other subjects, either separately or in combination with each other. 
1. Has the University Engaged in Government Speech? 
“The Supreme Court has held that when the government is the speaker, 
the First Amendment does not apply at all, or provide a basis for challenging 
the government’s action.”375  In 2009, the Court “affirmed and extended 
this principle in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum . . . .”376  Although 
Pleasant Grove377 did not involve a university but a city park,378 there is little 
reason to doubt its application to public universities.  The Court’s 
unanimous decision in Pleasant Grove held that the challenged exercise of 
government speech—allowing the placement of donated monuments on 
public land—was not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.379  
This decision went beyond the borders set by the Court in Rust v. Sullivan380 
and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing381 because for “the first time the Court 
has said that the government can adopt private speech as its own and 
thereby avoid the First Amendment.”382 
When public universities engage in government speech, they are 
“accountable to the electorate and the political process”383 rather than the 
courts.  Hence, the First Amendment is mute when universities speak.384  
This raises the question of whether a university can decide to adopt a 
particular side’s position as its own message, thereby terminating an ongoing 
campus dispute and escaping First Amendment preclusion by favoring one 
 
375. Erwin Chemerinsky, Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture: Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
723, 730 (2011) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court]. 
376. Id. 
377. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
378. See Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 375, at 730 (describing the context of 
the case where a city park contained eleven privately donated monuments and the subsequent denial 
by the City of Pleasant Grove of the request to erect a monument associated with the religious 
organization); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 566 (2005) (holding the 
government speech, at issue, was exempt from First Amendment analysis). 
379. Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 370, at 731. 
380. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
381. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
382. Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 370, at 731. 
383. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1284. 
384. Id. at 1283–84. 
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side of a campus debate.385  Prevailing case law answers this question in the 
affirmative, thus allowing a university to “pick and choose the viewpoints it 
expresses—the justification need not be neutral.”386 
2. Are Universities Public Forums? 
As previously noted, free speech norms are placed under stress when 
distinguishing between communication within a public university versus 
communication within a public square.  Generally, when the government 
restricts speech on property it owns, or in a medium of communications 
owned by the government such as a public school paper or a public campus, 
a court will analyze restrictions on speech in terms of the type of forum 
involved.387  In Widmar v. Vincent,388 for instance, the Court held the 
government could not “exclude religious groups from using . . . public 
school classrooms for after-hours meetings if the government” opened such 
rooms to general public discourse.389  Forum analysis typically applies to 
government-owned, as opposed to privately-owned property or channels of 
communication.390  Government-owned property is divided into three 
categories: public forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum.391  
The more public the forum, the more likely that the First Amendment 
 
385. My debt to Chemerinsky should be obvious.  See Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, 
supra note 370, at 731 (discussing the possibility of the government circumventing private speech as its 
own to bypass the First Amendment). 
386. Blackman, supra note 346, at 14 (citing Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); Rumsfeld v. F. for 
Acad. & Institutional Rts, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)). 
387. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1262. 
388. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–77 (1981) (holding the principle of keeping 
regulations of speech content-neutral is violated when a state university makes its facilities available for 
the activities of registered student groups but denies a registered religious group use of such facilities 
because of a university regulation prohibiting the use of university buildings for religious purposes).  
389. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1263. 
390. Id. at 1262. 
391. Id.  “A public forum is government property that has traditionally been held open to public 
discourse such as . . . public parks” wherein the government generally “impose[s] content-neutral 
times, place, or manner” restrictions.  Id.  A limited public forum refers to a government-owned 
channel of communication or government-owned property that is not traditionally open to public 
discourse; however, nonetheless, “the government . . . has chosen to open this channel . . . to public 
discourse for a time.”  Id. at 1262.  A nonpublic forum is “government property, or a government-
owned [communication channel]” not traditionally held “open to public discourse and that the 
government has chosen not to open to such discourse.”  Id. at 1263.  Examples would include “a public 
school classroom when class is in session.”  Id. 
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controls.392  Generally speaking, universities are not properly seen as public 
forums; thus, free speech rules have limited campus value.  
3. Academic Freedom Rules 
The warp and woof of academic freedom rules shrink the application of 
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment law to universities.393  This is true, 
even if one agrees with Professor MacKinnon’s claim of academic 
freedom’s trajectory tracing the same arc, which advances substantive 
inequality.394  The contest between academic freedom rules and the 
institution’s research and educational mission on the one hand and the 
pursuit of unconstrained speech accompanied by attempts to shut down 
opposing viewpoints on the other has given rise to a fierce debate.  This 
debate’s temperature has skyrocketed, reflecting society’s mounting 
ideological struggles in the wake of liberalism’s decomposition.395  
Although decomposition mounts as Americans are drawn irresistibly to 
individualism and isolation while pursuing un-constrainable liberty,396 
citizens are sympathetic to a broad consensus on the value of speech.  
Accordingly, citizens agree it is doubtful that a diverse, democratic society 
or a pluralistic university can survive without some measure of tolerance for 
opposing viewpoints.397  Constructing tolerance in an educational 
environment—where neither free speech in isolation from other values nor 
the cultivation by the polity of democratic governance is the institution’s 
objective—is difficult despite the hunch that universities ought to advance 
 
392. Id. at 1263. 
393. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 6–8 
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
394. See MacKinnon, supra note 286, at 150 (arguing academic freedom has been weaponized 
“in the hands of sexual harassers and racists . . . against students who claim their equality rights based 
on sex and race”). 
395. See, e.g., Ahmari, supra note 208, at 48–50 (suggesting the move toward a liberal consensus 
has been transmuted into “a profoundly illiberal, repressive force—[despite or] precisely because it 
grants the autonomous individual such wide berth to define what is good and true”). 
396. See, e.g., Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause 
for Labor’s Decline, 16 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 133, 133–42 (explaining utilitarian individualism’s 
deterioration increases as Americans move toward expressive individualism). 
397. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 158–59 (stating a more tolerant and inclusive 
society and university fosters a diverse, democratic society).  But see, e.g., Kevin den Dulk, Isolation and 
the Prospects for Democracy: the Challenge of the Alienated: Does Pluralism Have an Answer to Our Social 
Estrangement?, COMMENT (May 24, 2018), https://www.cardus.ca/comment/article/isolation-and-the-
prospects-for-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/2YKT-DQSA] (referencing Robert Putnam’s opinion 
that increasing levels of ethnic and ideological diversity within contemporary society correspond 
negatively with the trust and solidarity necessary to sustain conversations). 
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debate.  The advancing debate must be within limits that constrain certain 
expressions, which “distract from, rather than contribute to, the educational 
focus of the discussion.”398 
Because campuses are organized by academic freedom rules,399 which 
non-neutrally400 serve a university’s purposes,401 university debates operate 
in tension with principles encouraging maximum freedom of expression.402  
Since free speech norms pivot on whether expression advances self-
government—and universities aim to further education and academic 
inquiry achievable through academic freedom—classic First Amendment 
principles are largely inapplicable to universities.403  On one account, 
“[a]cademic freedom means that both faculty members and students can 
engage in intellectual debate without fear of censorship or retaliation.”404  
In this regard, academic freedom includes the right to express and challenge 
one another’s views without fear, as long as they do not impair others’ rights.  
“[I]n the case of faculty members,” if their views do not demonstrate 
“professional ignoran[ce], incompeten[ce], or dishonest[y] with regard to 
their discipline”, they retain academic freedom.405 
Such views make sense, so long as people concede academic freedom 
principles constrict the scope of modern freedom of speech doctrines.406  
In this view, academic freedom rules are implicated in “appropriately 
translating the principles of [significant constitutional cases involving public 
schools such as] Tinker et al. to colleges and universities”407 because both 
public schools and universities must deal with students rather than members 
 
398. Flanders, supra note 66, at 154. 
399. See Cary Nelson, Defining Academic Freedom: Penn State Professors Move to Given More Leeway to 
Faculty Members Dealing with Controversial Issues, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 21, 2010), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/12/21/defining-academic-freedom [https://perma. 
cc/PC43-FH35] (discussing implications of academic freedom and what is and is not allowed). 
400. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 346, at 15–19 (offering examples of non-neutral behavior by 
universities in the domain of speakers who are invited by student groups). 
401. Post, supra note 71, at 112 (suggesting First Amendment principles may not apply to 
universities because the legitimacy of speech hinges on whether it advances self-government, while 
universities exist to further academic inquiry and education). 
402. See Nelson, supra note 399 (clarifying the boundaries of academic freedom). 
403. Post, supra note 71, at 112. 
404. Nelson, supra note 399. 
405. Id. 
406. Cf. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 71, at 1283–85 (contrasting “government regulation 
of private speech [with] speech by the government” and providing an historical background). 
407. Flanders, supra note 66, at 140–41. 
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of the public at-large.408  This line of cases confirms the Court’s acceptance 
of a “wide range of permissible restrictions on free speech”.409 
Nonetheless, in Healy v. James,410 to advance debate at Central 
Connecticut State College, students sought recognition for “a local chapter 
of Students for a Democratic Society.”411  The university’s president 
refused, and the students sued under the First Amendment.412  Case law 
indicates high school and college students were both subject to instruction, 
and classes were the main vehicle for this objective; thus, making it difficult 
to posit a decisive break between the nature of high schools and 
universities.413  Nonetheless, the Healy Court observed “state colleges and 
universities,” like the high school students in Tinker, “are not enclaves 
immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”414  In Healy, 
Justice Powell noted: “The college classroom with its surrounding environs 
is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional 
ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic 
freedom.”415  While Justice Powell’s analysis coheres with liberalism’s 
emphasis on freedom of inquiry, and while he wrongly concludes that 
classrooms are marketplaces of ideas, and conflates academic freedom with 
the First Amendment, the Court maintained that “First Amendment rights 
must always be applied ‘in light of the special characteristics of the . . . 
environment’ in the particular case.”416  This conclusion coheres with the 
necessity of limits on speech.  Consistent with these limits, the Healy Court 
upheld the students’ claim for recognition but also determined that the 
university environment justifies insistence on compliance with certain 




409. Id. at 147–48. 
410. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
411. Id. at 170. 
412. Id. 
413. Flanders, supra note 66, at 153, 154; see also Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason 
Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 627 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding Tinker ought to be applied to universities in 
a way that accounts for institutional differences between universities and secondary schools); Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F. 3d 1277, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 
(1st Cir. 1993)) (indicating the court is not unmindful of the differences between university and high 
school students in terms of age and maturity). 
414. Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1960)). 
415. Id. at 180–81. 
416. Id. at 180 (omission in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
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violations to safeguard “the traditional academic atmosphere.”417 
Despite the language of Healy, free speech intuitions remain under threat 
in public universities, and the deployment of either classic or inventive free 
speech doctrines against such threats face a bleak future.  Commentators, 
who rightly condemn the uncritical application of freedom of speech 
doctrines to campus life, offer two weighty questions that are difficult to 
answer in the affirmative.  The questions include: (a) Do First Amendment 
protections attach to speech in a university and (b) Does speech—meaning 
the advancement of the process of self-government in our republic—occur 
within universities,418 a query that helps determine whether a university free 
speech crisis exists.419  Whether the First Amendment applies to private 
universities or not,420 and beyond the possibility of a speech crisis421 or the 
differing free speech rights of three different groups,422 critics of the 
blanket application of the First Amendment to public universities 
persistently emphasize that speech should ordinarily be “protected 
according to principles of academic freedom.”423  This analysis repudiates 
both the Supreme Court’s confused analysis and conflation of academic 
freedom rules and the First Amendment in Healy and the Court’s confused 
analysis—claiming classrooms are a marketplace of ideas.424  
Conflation and confusion reigns because commentators—including 
Justices of the Supreme Court—“identify liberty of thought, unfettered 
inquiry, and robust debate as foundational values within higher 
education”.425  Since universities are not a free market for ideas, there is not 
a clean break between universities and public high schools,426 and a 
principled distinction exists between First Amendment norms and academic 
freedom rules, First Amendment principles must therefore shrink.  Massive 
shrinkage is warranted because universities are driven by objectives, which 
 
417. Id. at 193–94, 194 n.24. 
418. Post, supra note 71, at 112. 
419. See Healy, supra note 354, at 1066 (giving examples of free speech issues on college 
campuses). 
420. See id. (contending the First Amendment is inapplicable to private universities). 
421. See id. at 1067–69 (noting the limited number of First Amendment violations among 4,700 
colleges in the United States). 
422. Id. at 1070–81 (observing the free speech rights of three different groups—faculty, 
students, and outside speakers—should be distinguished). 
423. Post, supra note 71, at 112. 
424. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972). 
425. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 156. 
426. Flanders, supra note 66, at 152–53. 
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are calculated to create competent communities while cultivating 
independent minds.427  Universities fashion a structured process designed 
to spark self-creation as part of liberalism’s goals428 and ostensibly assist 
society in pursuing rational certainty.429  Speech has a role in this process, 
but its role dwindles in the face of academic freedom rules’ superiority.  
Consequently, even though government viewpoint discrimination in the 
public square constitutes a per se violation of the First Amendment,430 
campuses can freely engage in such discrimination and compel speech 
because universities “do not consider all ideas to be equal.”431  This 
approach turns classic First Amendment norms on their head as campus 
administrators constrict certain categories of speech while simultaneously 
elevating others.432  Academic freedom rules supply an undefined third 
zone between unconstrained speech and complete censorship.  This enables 
universities to be bound by rules found in the Tinker quartet of cases, subject 
to the stipulation that the approach taken should be adjusted to fit students’ 
needs and characteristics in college.433  
4. Speech in the Mirror of Harassment Rules 
Consistent with Professor Weinrib’s concern that free speech principles 
inadequately protect minorities from harm and may trigger the rise of 
hateful demagogues,434 observers, including the President in his recent 
Executive Order,435 indicate more must be done to protect students from 
discrimination in schools and colleges.  Harassment consists of speech that 
 
427. Post, supra note 71, at 115 (arguing “only universities reproduce, refine, and conserve the 
practices, beliefs, and methods of knowing that define” a particular academic discipline). 
428. Id. at 113–14. 
429. BETTY, supra note 212, at 12 (“There is no power in the world—economic, political, 
religious or social—that can compete with rational certainty.  The West has sacrificed everything to 
this need: religion, happiness, hope—and, finally, its own life.”). 
430. See Bloom, Jr., supra note 1, at 23 (noting the Supreme Court has determined speech 
regulations of viewpoint are prohibited per se). 
431. Post, supra note 71, at 116. 
432. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 150–52 (listing what campuses can and 
cannot do).  
433. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
434. See Weinrib, supra note 49, at 66–67 (showing a commitment to the First Amendment, no 
matter how inventive, may prove inadequate to problems disfavored groups face). 
435. See Exec. Order No. 13,899, 84 Fed. Reg. 68,779 (Dec. 16, 2019) (noting the increase in 
anti-Semitic incidents relating to students). 
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targets an individual and is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, 
and that so undermines and detracts from the victim[’s] educational 
experience, that the victim-student [is] effectively denied equal access to an 
institution’s resources and opportunities.”436  The Civil Rights Act437 and 
Education Amendments Act438 mandate compliance obligations pursuant 
to the Department of Education’s financial assistance rules.439  Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.440 
Anti-harassment rules are difficult to dismiss because they gel with the 
university’s mission to teach students how to debate ideas vigorously within 
a forum constrained by academic freedom and inquiry rules, while 
complying with the canons of civility.441 
Harassment rules play a role in constraining expressive acts at both public 
and private universities under federal financial assistance rules.  In an era 
that has seen rising plots designed to carry out anti-Semitic attacks in the 
 
436. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). 
437. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
438. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
439. Off. of Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Title VI and Title IX 
Religious Discrimination in Schools and Colleges (Sept. 13, 2004), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html [https://perma.cc/9FEN-2MZF] (noting the Department 
of Education is committed to enforcing civil rights laws even though the “OCR’s jurisdiction does not 
extend to religious discrimination”).  “The OCR aggressively investigates alleged race or ethnic 
harassment against Arab Muslim, Sikh and Jewish students.”  Id.  On one view—largely connected 
with the Supreme Court’s decision making in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb—Jews, for instance, 
“should be considered members of a distinct ‘race’ for purposes of interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.”  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Marcus, Bullying As A Civil Rights Violation: The U.S. Department of Education’s 
Approach to Harassment, 12 ENGAGE 54, 56 (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Bullying As a Civil Rights 
Violation] (referring to the OCR’s use of Shaare Tefila as guiding line for Title VI prosecutions of anti-
Semitic harassment). 
440. OFF. OF CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT HIGHLIGHTS: 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (2012), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/title-vi-
enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VPN-5F9U] (citing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).  
441. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, 53 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 223–24 (1990) (suggesting it is a university’s mission to teach students to 
vigorously perform within the marketplace of ideas). 
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United States,442 federal harassment rules face a complex backdrop because 
commentators worry whether the working definition of anti-Semitism is 
sufficiently protective of Jewish students.443  Others worry that traditional 
anti-Semitism has been converted into a “new anti-Semitism,” which directs 
its ire against the state of Israel.444  Other complex issues surface as well, 
including two sets of questions.445  First, how should institutions 
distinguish, if at all, between unlawful ethnic or ancestral anti-Semitism and 
other forms of religious anti-Semitism that are outside the scope of the 
federal government’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) policy coupled with the 
related inquiry whether constitutional limitations on harassment 
investigations exists.446  Second, questions surface regarding whether “[t]he 
distinctions between racial and religious prejudice are elided by [other] 
definitions, such as Merriam-Webster’s which straddle the difference, defining 
anti-Semitism as ‘[h]ostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a 
religious group or ‘race.’”447 
When speech is labeled a form of harassment, bullying, or hate speech, 
multifaceted issues surface because “there is not a category of speech known 
as ‘hate speech’ that may uniformly be prohibited or punished.”448  This view 
adheres to the notion that society favors free speech, whereas individuals 
seek protection from particular messages.449  Although this debate 
continues unabated, and though hate speech may be proscribed under 
certain circumstances,450 proponents of free speech maximalism would 
limit university speech restrictions to a narrow category inclusive of hate 
 
442. See Synagogue Massacre Led to String of Attack Plots, Jewish Group Says, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 
2019, 9:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/20/jewish-attacks-pittsburgh-052868 
[https://perma.cc/ZGP3-WSEQ] (noting the rise in arrests relating to plots to attack synagogues).  
443. See KENNETH L. MARCUS, THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-SEMITISM 20–21(2015) 
[hereinafter MARCUS, THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-SEMITISM] (noting Kenneth Stern was criticized 
after co-authoring a statement indicating the “Working Definition” could be used to censor speech).  
444. See Marcus, Bullying As a Civil Rights Violation, supra note 439, at 56 (questioning whether 
“new anti-Semitism” is addressed by standing practices of OCR prosecution). 
445. See id. (suggesting additional complexity). 
446. Id. 
447. MARCUS, THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 443, at 56 (second emphasis 
deleted). 
448. Stephen J. Wermiel, The Ongoing Challenge to Define Free Speech, A.B.A., https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-
to-define-free-speech/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/6MFX-5Q 
AM] (emphasis added). 
449. Id. 
450. See, e.g., Flanders, supra note 66, at 141 n.27 (arguing modern Supreme Court decisions 
proscribing hate speech are consistent with its earlier precedents, such as Tinker). 
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speech, fighting words, true threats, and incitement constraints as defined 
by the Court in true public forum cases.451  Outside this category, they 
assert, offensive speech would be impermissible.452  Such views are 
predicated on the deduction that Supreme Court speech canons apply to 
campuses—consistent with some case law—a stance that is bolstered by a 
normative ideal viewing universities as public forums wherein tolerance is 
demanded and offense is expected.453  But as Professor Flanders shows, 
this approach is inapplicable because “universities are in fact schools and 
not pure ‘marketplaces of ideas,’ where speech generally goes 
unregulated.”454  
Notwithstanding this debate, it bears noting the OCR is charged with 
interpreting a university’s nondiscrimination obligations under Title VI, 
Title IX,455 and other rules.456  The OCR’s interpretative gloss supports 
 
451. See id. at 141 (suggesting those promoting limiting First Amendment speech on campus to 
the strictest category is not ideal). 
452. Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech Is Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses, VOX 
(Dec. 26, 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-
speech-first-amendment-protest [https://perma.cc/WTZ4-5GNL] (stating the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly said “the First Amendment means public institutions cannot punish speech, or exclude 
speakers,” when and if the speech “is hateful or deeply offensive”). 
453. See Flanders, supra note 66, at 142 (noting the concept of universities being a public forum 
is more rooted in normative ideals than in law). 
454. See id. at 141 (demonstrating support for the Tinker approach to free speech on university 
campuses). 
455. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 15 (suggesting the OCR interprets 
campuses’ duties under Title VI and the Title IX with regard to conducting learning environments). 
456. More specifically: 
Educational institutions have a responsibility to protect every student’s right to learn in a safe 
environment free from unlawful discrimination and to prevent unjust deprivations of that right.  
The Office for Civil Rights enforces several Federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination 
in programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance from the Department of 
Education. . . .   
Discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin is prohibited by Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. . . .   
Discrimination on the basis of sex is prohibited by Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972.  This includes discrimination based on pregnancy, parental status, and sex stereotypes . . . .   
Discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 and Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Title II prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of disability by public entities, whether or not they receive federal financial 
assistance). . . .   
Discrimination on the basis of age is prohibited by Age Discrimination Act of 1975. 
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claims that the expression of certain ideas contributes to harassment.  The 
University of California at Irvine, a public university, supplies an example of 
such a resolved claim against the Zionist Organization of America 
(ZOA).457  ZOA charged the university with creating “a hostile learning 
environment for Jewish students” because the school’s administrators 
permitted speakers, who were invited by the Students for Justice for 
Palestine and the Muslim Student Union, to engage in offensive speech.458  
This claim was denied.459  Although this outcome may be inconsistent with 
the anti-bullying component of academic freedom,460 it was not completely 
surprising for two reasons.  For one, the OCR earlier clarified “that it has 
no power to force universities to police speech that is protected by the 
First Amendment and that public universities could not ban merely 
offensive speech.”461  Second, Title VI harassment rules may have limited 
applicability if a complaint asserts that speech, which “merely expresses 
offensive views toward a protected class” of individuals, does not adversely 
 
 
These civil rights laws extend to all state education agencies, elementary and secondary school 
systems, colleges and universities, vocational schools, proprietary schools, state vocational 
rehabilitation agencies, libraries and museums that receive federal financial assistance from ED.  
These include all public schools and most public and private colleges and universities. 
Programs or activities that receive ED funds must provide aids, benefits or services in a 
nondiscriminatory manner in an environment free from discriminatory harassment that limits 
educational opportunities.  Such aids, benefits or services may include, but are not limited to, 
admissions, recruitment, financial aid, academic programs, student treatment and services, 
counseling and guidance, discipline, classroom assignment, grading, vocational education, 
recreation, physical education, athletics, and housing.  Some of the civil rights laws enforced by 
OCR also extend to employment. 
OCR also enforces the Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act.  Under this Act, OCR can investigate 
complaints involving the denial of equal access or a fair opportunity to meet to, or discrimination 
against, any youth group officially affiliated with a group or organization listed in title 36 of the 
United States Code (as a patriotic society) that is intended to serve young people under the age 
of 21 that requests to conduct a meeting at a public elementary school, a public secondary school, 
or a state or local education agency that receives funds from ED.  
OFF. OF CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., How to File a Discrimination Complaint with the Office for Civil 
Rights, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/howto.html?src=rt [https://perma.cc/ 
44TN-VZR5]. 
457. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 15. 
458. Id. 15–16. 
459. Id. 
460. See Post, supra note 71, at 114 (noting academic freedom does not license professors to 
bully their students). 
461. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 17. 
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affect “a student’s educational opportunities or benefits.”462 
Conversely, one can persuasively argue any examination of speech claims 
within a university should consider both anti-harassment concerns and the 
existence of exceptional circumstances that contextualize certain categories 
of expression.  Virginia v. Black463 provides an example.  In Virginia, the 
Court upheld an anti-cross burning statute by considering the statute’s 
prohibition in the context of the actor’s intent to intimidate; this approach 
provides a roadmap for universities.464  Professor MacKinnon argues the 
Black Court’s examination of “the history of the reality of cross burning—
Ku Klux Klan terrorism, heralding lynching and other torture and murder—
[shows] the practice was . . . [a] ‘symbol of hate,’” even though, 
communicative conduct took place.465  To the extent that offensive speech, 
accompanied by some measure of conduct, surfaces and targets a historically 
besieged group—such as Jews or other minorities—contextualization could 
help students and universities demonstrate that offensive speech is 
impermissible despite claims to the contrary.466  Beyond the possibility, 
academic freedom rules may plausibly constrain hate speech that is viewed 
in a properly contextualized manner; legitimate attempts to bar such 
expressions challenge the notion that the First Amendment applies fully to 
universities.  If speech is properly contextualized, it may arguably do more 
than merely provide an example of conduct implicating “pure” speech, thus 
indicating federal anti-harassment rules should apply to trench on speech 
claims. 
5. Social Justice, Free Speech, and Academic Freedom Rules 
A new heuristic, fashioned by recent ideological efforts, has disrupted free 
speech norms and academic freedom rules.  This heuristic originates in an 
elevated form of moral knowledge, insistent upon interpreting society 
“through the lens of ‘social justice’, ‘identity group politics’ and 
‘intersectionalism’ . . . .”467  Nevertheless, historically, free speech norms 
 
462. Id. at 120–21; see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999) 
(describing the type of sexual harassment a student must establish in a discrimination suit). 
463. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
464. Id. at 367; MacKinnon, supra note 286, at 152. 
465. MacKinnon, supra note 286, at 152. 
466. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 17 (suggesting universities cannot ban merely 
offensive speech). 
467. MURRAY, supra note 209, at 2–3 (noting identity politics atomizes according to sex, gender, 
and sexual preferences and presumes there is some elevated moral knowledge that comes with such 
distinct identities leading to a system of justice, which emerges from the perpetually moving hierarchy 
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empower individuals and groups disinterested in transforming language 
from: a means of expression between individuals who share common but 
differing yet reconcilable values into: a vehicle that conceals ideological 
endeavors designed to conform reality to “a particular vision of the 
world.”468  Because there is no escaping the metaphysical, this largely 
obscured metaphysical move places the targets of such a shift at risk.469  
Virtually any attempt to untie the knot of the social justice story with all of 
its complexity and its gnarled, taut, and disparate plotlines indicates that 
social justice warriors (SJWs) put academic freedom rules and free speech 
values through a threshing sledge in order to attend to putative deprivation 
and perceived harms associated with the university.470 
Using Jacques Derrida’s teachings of postmodern power, SJWs focus  
on the reversal of Platonist hierarchies, a move which may lead to the 
elevation of evil over good,471 and demonstrates “barbarism is not a 
primitive form of life, . . but a pathological development of civilization.”472  
Although Derrida argues that the very experience of a thing is a matter of 
interpretation,473 SJWs develop dogmas, emphasizing the formation of 
“ideologically motivated moral[, even religious] communities”; a maneuver 
provoking scholarship in grievance studies and creating scriptural  
 
uncovered).  This leads to new heuristics for individuals to ingest and new ways of policing and 
enforcing these new heuristics thus creating a new religion.  Id. at 3–4.  Victories attained by identity 
groups must be followed by additional victories even if the movement has already achieved its 
objectives, thus placing more avenues of speech under threat.  Id. at 1–9. 
468. BESANÇON, supra note 233, at 14.  
469. See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Liberalism & Sacred Order, AM. CONSERVATIVE (May 21, 2020, 11:57 
AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/justin-lee-metaphysics-liberalism-sacred-
order-deneen/ [https://perma.cc/U3GD-36R3] (“There is no escaping metaphysics—that is, an 
underlying account of the nature of reality.  Metaphysics also implies a moral and political 
anthropology: an account of what a human being is . . . the reason we are having so many problems 
sorting ourselves out politically is because we, as a late liberal polity, lack a shared metaphysics.”). 
470. Victories attained by identity groups must be followed by additional victories even if the 
movement has already achieved its objectives, thus placing more avenues of speech under threat.  See, 
e.g., MURRAY, supra note 209, at 1–9 (discussing the speed of wars fought with the support of large tech 
companies resulted in great success for postmodernism). 
471. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 30, 2019), https://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/derrida/ [https://perma.cc/QU2H-5H82]. 
472. JOHN GRAY, THE SILENCE OF ANIMALS: ON PROGRESS AND OTHER MODERN 
MYTHS 9–10 (2013). 
473. JAMES K. A. SMITH, WHO’S AFRAID OF POSTMODERNISM?: TAKING DERRIDA, 
LYOTARD, AND FOUCAULT TO CHURCH 49 (2006) [hereinafter SMITH, WHO’S AFRAID OF 
POSTMODERNISM]. 
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canon.474  These moves are grounded in victimhood475 may be 
disconnected from reality as SJWs and other members of the Left advance 
allegations of rising human rights and other violations on university 
campuses and elsewhere.  Such claims are frequently inversely 
disproportionate to the nation’s actual number of such violations.476  While 
SJWs are not alone in conflating their understanding of truth with 
something quite different—objective reality477—when university 
administrators readily accept such conflations as part of liberalism’s essential 
fabric, it may have suffocating consequences.  Such consequences may 
include (a) allowing SJWs to push against an open door labeled progress and 
tolerance,478 thus providing a fresh opportunity to betray the Jews479 and 
others; (b) facilitating the coddling of student minds as part of an elevation 
of identity politics;480 and (c) corresponding with 
Professor Stephen Carter’s deduction that “the true harbinger of an 
authoritarian future lives not in the White House but in the groves of 
academe.”481 
Complexity reigns and full comprehension eludes, in an environment 
where postmodern activists, whether through the exercise of either free 
speech rights or academic freedom norms, are unleashed to assert that the 
First Amendment and/or academic freedom rules, were once seen as a 
defense of the powerless, but have now become a weapon of the 
powerful.482  Propelled by this intuition, SJWs may attempt to block their 
fellow citizens’ participation in the formation of public opinion or the life 
 
474. James A. Lindsay & Mike Nayna, Postmodern Religion & the Faith of Social Justice, AREO 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://areomagazine.com/2018/12/18/postmodern-religion-and-the-faith-of-
social-justice [https://perma.cc/X3T9-9WFM]. 
475. MURRAY, supra note 209, at 245–48 (noting social justice campaigners focus on 
representing those with alleged rights grievances). 
476. Id. at 232. 
477. SMITH, WHO’S AFRAID OF POSTMODERNISM, supra note 469, at 43 (explaining this 
conflation). 
478. Hutchison, Chasing Shadows, supra note 12, at 224.  
479. See generally WISSE, supra note 35, at 21–42 (describing the contours of this ongoing betrayal 
including the possibly emptiness of progress and the limits of tolerance). 
480. See, e.g., Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind,  
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-
the-american-mind/399356/ [https://perma.cc/QU4S-H52G] (suggesting America’s universities 
feature students’ efforts to scrub campuses of distressing words and issues). 
481. Stephen L. Carter, The Ideology Behind Intolerant College Students, BLOOMBERG OP. (Mar. 6, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-03-06/the-ideology-behind-intolerant-
college-students [https://perma.cc/5DRP-HKZJ].  
482. MacKinnon, supra note 286, at 140. 
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of the academic community based on SJWs’ unique preferences rather than 
in compliance with legal doctrines or cognizable norms applicable to all 
members of the academic community.  
The unchallenged exercise of SJWs’ normative claims may shrink their 
opponent’s application of academic freedom and, where applicable, 
freedom of speech principles, for their opponents, in exchange for trigger 
warnings, assertions of victimology, and the invocation of an aristocracy of 
grievance.483  Although it is unlikely that SJW problem-solving corresponds 
with reality in every case, it often “coincides with attempts by Western 
leaders to hide the resurgence of anti-Jewish hatred”.484  Uncritical 
acceptance of SJW views empowers one faction of the polity at the expense 
of another, mangles the free speech debate, leads to unequal enforcement 
of speech rights, and diminishes the importance and uniform application of 
academic freedom rules; thus, exposing disempowered and disfavored 
groups to revulsion or violence. 
Corresponding with SJWs’ heuristics afflicting the contemporary Left,485 
this possibility—emphasizing the rights of one side of a debate and the 
exigent necessity of depriving the other side of similar rights—has surfaced 
repeatedly on campus.486  While it is a mistake for universities to focus 
solely on freedom of speech rules at the expense of defending disputed 
events on academic freedom grounds and freedom of inquiry norms, a 
pattern of disruptions has surfaced, including events at the University of 
Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, Middlebury College (all private 
schools), and elsewhere,487 including the University of California at 
Irvine.488  At the University of Chicago, Professor Kontorovich, a well-
known Jewish scholar, after accepting an invitation to lecture about the 
intersection of the First Amendment and anti-BDS laws, dealt with a 
 
483. Hutchison, Chasing Shadows, supra note 12, at 217–33 (analyzing grievances and BDS). 
484. Id. at 224 (citation omitted). 
485. Loeffler, supra note 60. 
486. Scott Jaschik, Who Gets Shouted Down on Campus?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/02/26/event-sponsored-jewish-and-pro-israel-groups-
university-virginia-disrupted-and [https://perma.cc/6NLB-8R5U] (describing the disruption of an 
event sponsored by Jewish and pro-Israel groups at the University of Virginia and various similar 
disruptions at other campuses). 
487. See, e.g., Ryszard Legutko, The Demon in Middlebury, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/08/the-demon-in-middlebury [https://perma.cc/UF9C-
Z9XM] [hereinafter Legutko, The Demon in Middlebury] (showing the intolerance on display at 
Middlebury College is not an isolated incident). 
488. See, e.g., Jaschik, supra note 482 (referring to an incident in which a pro-Israel group 
disrupted a talk given by Michael Oren at the University of Chicago). 
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virulent disruption from students.489  At the University of Pennsylvania, a 
student group’s invitation to Professor Amy Wax to speak on racial 
inequality provoked an outpouring of vituperation and the privileging of 
dissenting groups to abuse the professor while fellow faculty members 
responded by falsely labeling her writings as “the equivalent of a swastika or 
a burning cross.”490  Similarly, Professor Legutko experienced vitriolic 
intolerance and cancellation at Middlebury College.491  The proliferation of 
such moves appears integrated with a ritual that fashions grievances into a 
religion, signaling that those with differing political and ideological views 
can no longer converse with one another, even within the guardrails, 
academic freedom properly provides.492  Among an avalanche of 
consequences, this move beckons one final probability: violence.493  With 
its inherent capacity to shut down speech, violence is an ever-present 
possibility when students’ rights to demonstrate against a particular 
viewpoint494 are transformed into an illegitimate right to disrupt or 
otherwise terrorize a university event held in a classroom or on campus.495  
6. Group Libel Statutes? 
Beyond the ability of academic freedom principles and harassment rules 
to constrain the application of First Amendment norms on university 
campuses and beyond the exact boundaries of a university’s purposive goals, 
anti-Semitism may be constrained via the application of criminal libel 
statutes in use since 1936.  In 1936, Mayor La Guardia responded to a hate-
merchant’s writings attacking “Jewish anti-Americanism and Talmudic 
communism,” “by invoking his power as chief magistrate of the city of New 
York to issue a summons for criminal-libel.”496  “By the end of the 1940s, 
eight states had enacted statutes” criminalizing different group libel 
 
489. Blackman, supra note 346, at 56–59.  
490. Alexander Riley, Woke Totemism, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2019), https://www.firstthings. 
com/article/2019/08/woke-totemism [https://perma.cc/6UZD-AG3H]. 
491. Legutko, The Demon in Middlebury, supra note 483. 
492. See Riley, supra note 486 (discussing anthropologists’ findings of aboriginal religion). 
493. MURRAY, supra note 209, at 253–54; see also JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, BEFORE THE 
SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA’S CULTURE WAR 4–5 (1994) 
(arguing culture wars precede violence). 
494. See Blackman, supra note 346, at 25–26 (showing a “distinction between a demonstration 
and a disruption”). 
495. Id. at 29–45 (discussing demonstrations and disruptions at a public university). 
496. Loeffler, supra note 60. 
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forms.497  Furthermore, in 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,498 the Supreme 
Court upheld a state group libel law designed “to shut down the most 
extreme peddlers of racism and anti-Semitism,” in a case never 
overturned.499  Recall Judge Hand’s determined words are not only keys of 
persuasion but triggers to action.500  This conclusion’s deductive force 
justified the prohibition of advocacy counseling the violation of law because 
it lacks any democratic function.501  Similarly, one could argue this intuition 
justifies fettering criminal libel or racially defamatory speech because such 
expressions lack a democratic function and are thus incompatible with 
democracy.502  Accordingly, the state should constrain this type of 
speech.503  Going forward, Judge Hand’s intuitions sparked group libel laws 
or similar laws may hold promise in limiting hateful or discriminatory speech 
on campus without violating First Amendment norms or academic freedom 
rules.  Such laws may be useful off-campus as well. 
7. Speech and National Security Rules 
Freedom of speech norms, if applicable, face difficulties when national 
security rules come into play.  Chemerinsky and Gillman admit as much.504  
Separately, Professor Chemerinsky echoed Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion505 in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,506 upholding a federal law 
that prohibited the provision of “material support” to a “foreign terrorist 
organization.”507  This law withstood two groups’ challenges seeking 
First Amendment protection for their assistance to organizations “that had 
 
497. Id. 
498. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
499. Loeffler, supra note 60. 
500. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 18 (citing Judge Learned Hand). 
501. Id. 
502. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 46, at 30–50 (advocating the application of group libel statutes 
currently in force in five states, the continuing validity of Beauharnais v. Illinois, suggesting private libel 
is non-speech and that racism is an evil that can be restricted, asserting that private victims of 
defamation are entitled to redress for their injuries as opposed to public victims, and arguing racial 
defamation is not speech because categorizing racial defamation as speech confuses form with 
substance, and its value is outweighed by negative consequences). 
503. Blasi, Rights Skepticism and Majority Rule, supra note 68, at 18. 
504. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 2, at 23 (discussing the “constant tensions 
between free speech and other values” such as national security). 
505. Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 370, at 728–30; see Holder v. Humanitarian 
L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for permitting 
the punishment of speech absent evidence of likely harm). 
506. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
507. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). 
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been designated by the Department of State, as foreign terrorist 
organizations.”508  The Holder decision specifies that the speech at issue 
could be punished because it was not pure political speech but constituted 
material support of a terrorist group.509  The Supreme Court reached its 6-
3 decision, notwithstanding the contention that upholding the law would 
allow the punishment of speech without proof that it was likely to cause 
harm.510  The Court rejected its earlier decisions concerning incitement and 
especially Brandenburg, which allowed “pure advocacy of even the most 
unlawful activity—as long as that advocacy is not ‘directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such 
action.’”511  Disputing Holder, Chemerinsky concluded “the Court allowed 
the government to prohibit speech that in no way advocated terrorism or 
taught how to engage in terrorism.”512  Because Holder remains good law, 
invoking national security rules can constrain free speech at universities. 
8. Other, Often Overlapping Issues 
Contentious campus disputes implicating the First Amendment or 
academic freedom, including clashes regarding invited speakers, students’ 
speech off-campus, or students marching through the campus yelling 
repulsive chants, have arisen.  In resolving most speech issues, the pertinent 
constitutional question is whether and how severe the communicative 
restraints must be in order to achieve “the twin objectives of research and 
education.”513  Risking the repetition of frequently overlapping issues and 
concerns, “[a]cademic freedom turns on judgments of competence, whereas 
ordinary First Amendment principles forbid such judgments.  Academic 
freedom protects the autonomy of a profession, whereas First Amendment 
rights protect the freedom of individuals.”514  Where academic freedom 
requirements are most obscure, speech analysis reverts to first principles 
grounded in “the purposive nature of First Amendment rights.”515  
Conversely, in the absence of obscurity, we must return to “the premise that 
 
508. Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 370, at 728–29. 
509. See id. at 729 (concluding speech could be punished “so long as it was done in coordination 
with a foreign terrorist organization”). 
510. Holder, 561 U.S. at 40–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
511. Id. at 51 (omission in the original) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US. 444, 447 (1969) 
(per curiam)). 
512. Chemerinsky, Not A Free Speech Court, supra note 370, at 730. 
513. Post, supra note 71, at 121. 
514. Id. 
515. Id. at 121–22. 
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public universities may regulate speech as necessary to achieve their 
institutional objectives.”516  Correlatively, most student speech in the 
classroom and much academic research, even when protected by academic 
freedom, is exogenous to discovering political and economic truth.  Since 
First Amendment rules are thus ruled out of bounds, observers must turn 
to academic freedom rules, which uphold professors’ absolute freedom of 
thought, inquiry, discussion, and teaching but not the absolute freedom of 
utterance.517  Freedom of utterance is constrainable because universities 
may justifiably engage in content and viewpoint discrimination. 
Conversely, disputes regarding invited speakers involve uncertainty over 
whether such speakers implicate the university’s educational and research 
missions governed by academic freedom rules because such speakers are not 
responsible either for disciplinary competence or for competence in 
teaching.518  Moreover, outside speakers’ research fails to add to the 
university’s productivity and fails to create a long-term relationship with 
students contributing to their intellectual independence.519  Student-invited 
outside speakers may be excludable because such speakers “do not implicate 
the academic freedom of the faculty.”520  Additionally, “[s]tudents are 
accountable neither for the research mission of the university nor for its 
educational responsibilities”, thus making it difficult to claim such speakers 
support the goals of the university.521  When students invite speakers—
because they believe they have something worthwhile to say—“the first two 
cardinal rules of First Amendment jurisprudence are thus inapplicable” 
because in asserting “certain ideas are more worth hearing than others”, 
students exercise content and viewpoint discrimination.522  Content and 
viewpoint discrimination are acceptable “so long as they serve [the 
university’s] educational and research purposes.”523  This wrangle is 
solvable when universities clarify why they are prepared to “authorize 
student-invited outside speakers,” a move illuminating why the 
communication is or is not appropriate.524  The First Amendment rights of 
 
516. Id. at 121. 
517. Id. at 117. 
518. Id. 
519. Id. 
520. Id. at 118. 
521. Id. 
522. Id. at 118–19. 
523. Id. at 119. 
524. Id. 
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invited speakers are irrelevant, and the question becomes, “how policies that 
authorize students to invite speakers to campus do and do not advance 
institutional purposes of education and the expansion of knowledge.”525 
Student demonstrations on campus implicate the constitutionally difficult 
question of how public higher education’s mission is understood.  The 
Constitution contains no explicit account of this mission.  Similarly, 
traditional academic freedom principles do not necessarily tell us how to 
handle specific cases such as students marching through campus chanting 
repulsive slogans and carrying repugnant signs.526  Such demonstrations 
could not be excluded from a public park because cardinal 
First Amendment principles deem “public discourse immunized from 
regulation despite” its offensiveness.527  Instead, the university’s dilemma 
must be encapsulated in examining of the nature of a public university.528  
Careful analysis indicates the question of whether the demonstration is 
allowable on a public campus cannot be resolved based on of free speech 
principles.529 
Recent years have witnessed disputes regarding the regulation of off-
campus student speech, which “does not arise in the context of university 
activities.”530  Post observes that “as the connection between off-campus 
student speech and the campus environment grows more tenuous,” 
freedom of speech principles become a more attractive rationale to decide 
the legitimacy of off-campus conduct.531  Suppose a student’s speech has 
no connection with a university’s mission.  Then, justifying the regulation 
of off-campus behavior becomes difficult because such a move would 
merge with the already rejected view that universities should adopt an in loco 
parentis conception of education.532  Still, in states with group libel statutes, 




526. Id. at 121. 
527. Id.  
528. Id. 
529. Id. at 121–22. 
530. Id. at 119. 
531. Id. 
532. See id. at 119–20 (discussing the rejected view of universities justifying off-campus 
regulation of speech not comporting with the educational mission akin to a parent controlling all facets 
of a child’s life). 
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9. Closing Analysis 
Public universities and their facilities are designed to serve specific 
purposes.  The effort to achieve these goals supports regulation of speech 
independent of the four corners of the First Amendment.  The Supreme 
Court has established that a “university’s mission is education,” depriving 
the First Amendment of power to preclude a university from imposing 
“reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its 
campus and facilities.”533  Hence, a university has the “right to exclude . . . 
First Amendment activities that . . . substantially interfere with the 
opportunity of students to obtain an education.”534  In Professor Post’s 
view, “[i]f state universities could not regulate speech as required to achieve 
their mission, they would be forced to abstain from content discrimination; 
they would be compelled to treat all ideas equally; they would be disabled 
from compelling speech.  Neither private nor public universities could 
function under such severe constraints.”535  While freedom of speech in 
the public square prohibits the government from controlling what people 
say or “taking sides against any opinion except that which must express itself 
in the violation of the law”, universities are entitled to “evaluate the 
competence of both students and faculty; they must compel students and 
faculty to speak; they must routinely and pervasively engage in content 
discrimination.”536 
Simultaneously, as civilization’s tectonic plates shift as a consequence of 
liberal democracy’s looming moral insolvency, commentators face an 
intimidating range of questions while campus speech wars flare as both a 
“symptom and symbol of some larger political and cultural battle.”537  Such 
“wars are being waged primarily over hateful and offensive speech,”538 
raising the following questions: (A) whether universities are schools located 
along points of a continuum, thus implicating the Supreme Court’s classic 
public school decisions, which granted authority to states and school 
officials to proscribe student speech;539 (B) do Supreme Court 
 
533. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981). 
534. Id. at 277 (citing Healy v. James 408 U.S. 169, 188–89 (1972)). 
535. Post, supra note 71, at 120. 
536. Id. at 106–07, 120. 
537. See Healy, supra note 354, at 1063 (discussing the reoccurring nature of passionate academic 
debate on campus grounds). 
538. Id. 
539. See Flanders, supra note 66, at 140 (positing distinctions between high schools and 
universities should be made on a continuum); id. at 139–40 (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
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First Amendment rules deserve to be fully applied on campus; (C) under 
what circumstances can a college curtail speech—particularly anti-Semitic 
speech—when the expression, coupled with indicia of animus, is properly 
classifiable as harassment, incitement, and a form of discrimination; (D) can 
libelous speech, on- or off-campus, be constrained by statute; and (E) what 
are the implications of academic freedom rules for all of the above-
referenced questions? 
In the face of this interrogation, university administrators are torn 
between dueling sympathies: “a deep commitment to free speech” and an 
asserted, if incomplete, appeal, to academic freedom on the one hand, and 
a “strong commitment to diversity and the well-being of their students” on 
the other.540  After improperly refusing to see freedom of expression as a 
balanced canon, some administrators adopt maximalist positions to resolve 
their dueling sympathies and thereby welcome all expressions, “no matter 
how offensive or” inconsistent with academic freedom they may be.541  
Concurrently, administrators “embrace the proposition that all members of 
the academic community must have the freedom ‘to use campus grounds 
for the broad expression of ideas, even if those ideas are expressed in ways 
that run contrary to the norms of professional conduct.’”542  Free speech 
innovators impel such claims and drives the deduction that freedom of 
expression is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 
form of freedom.”543  Free speech innovators, valuing speech as an end in 
itself rather than a means to other ends,544 often claim the judicial triad’s 
mantle of authority545 even though innovation, when concretized, 
transforms the Constitution into a palimpsest bereft of any limiting 
principle.  If this analysis is correct, then the deification of freedom of 
expression, like liberalism itself, risks becoming long on inventiveness and 
short on defensible doctrine. 
Taken together, this analysis confirms the First Amendment constitutes 
the wrong framework for deciding most speech questions on university 
 
not yet limited its decisions to exclude universities); id. at 148 (addressing the categories of student 
speech that can be regulated and to what degree). 
540. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 354, at 1063 (examining the push and pull to eliminate hateful 
and offensive speech). 
541. Id. at 1064. 
542. Id. 
543. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
544. Feldman, supra note 5, at 640. 
545. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 49, at 48 (analyzing the judiciary’s role in shaping the modern 
First Amendment). 
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campuses because free speech principles, if they exist, are unlikely to trump 
academic freedom and inquiry rules at public universities.  This Article 
establishes academic freedom rules apply in most instances as a limiting 
principle, that libelous utterances are not necessarily within the domain of 
constitutionally protected speech,546 and bigots have the propensity to twist 
the law into a weapon used to assault constitutive components of the 
republic of which universities are a part.547  Limiting campus speech is 
warranted to deny hate-motivated actors the opportunity to spew repugnant 
claims advancing anti-Semitism or other forms of bigotry. 
In every instance—of student speech, student-invited speakers, student 
demonstrations, and limits on faculty utterance—the preeminent 
application of academic freedom rules are consistent with core speech 
principles that disallow blind devotion to the First Amendment when the 
expression at issue is irrelevant to the formation of public opinion such as 
commercial advertising or the mere advancement of personal preferences.  
Such communication is unprotected or subject to lesser protection because 
it is exogenous to the discovery, if possible, of political and economic 
truth.548  The invocation of this overall approach to campus speech 
vindicates both academic freedom, broadly conceived, and 
First Amendment principles perceived within boundaries provided by the 
judicial triad.  This approach will not end disputes but will ensure that 
disputes, even those led by free speech maximalists, will be fought out on 
terrain that is distanced from appeals to, often illusory, First Amendment 
norms. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
Speaking for all who pursue human progress, French Jewish intellectual 
Alain Finkielkraut said: “There is nothing more humiliating than to have to 
defend the truth.”549  The humiliating truth of anti-Semitism intensifies in 
an epoch wherein the history of liberalism’s betrayal of the Jews echoes in 
the antiphonal shouts of white supremacists blaming the Jewish people for 
 
546. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266–67 (1952). 
547. Loeffler, supra note 60 (observing public universities remain helpless while domestic 
extremist movements masquerade as a political cause). 
548. Post, supra note 71, at 107. 
549. WISSE, supra note 35, at xi. 
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the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.550  Such charges defy reality and 
the notion of progress and evoke Private Train’s contrapuntal angst as he 
studies an unfolding village massacre:  
This great evil.  Where does it come from?  How’d it steal into the world? 
What seed, of what root did it grow from?  Who’s doin’ this?  Who’s killin’  
us?  Robbing us of life and light.  Mocking us with the sight of what we  
might’ve known.  Does our ruin benefit the earth?  Does it help the grass  
to grow, the sun to shine?  Is this darkness in you, too?  Have you passed 
through this night?551 
Train’s anguish recalls Hannah Arendt’s account of the rise of anti-Semitism 
after European Jews lost power and influence.552  She observes the 
Dreyfuss affair “gave birth to the Zionist movement—the only political 
answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism, and the only ideology in which 
they have ever taken seriously a hostility that would place them in the center 
of world events.”553  These events include the world’s failure to take what 
the Nazis said about themselves seriously.554  
In the world we have inherited, where we strive to hear the silence of lives 
lost, where evil is not natural but voluntary,555 and where Americans are 
drawn irresistibly to self-referential individualism and isolation as part of 
liberalism’s decay, our collective memory dissolves as a result of the acid 
formed by the imperative of progress.  At the same time, while evidence 
mounts showing that equal rights are important but insufficient for 
democratic citizenship,556 liberalocrats—liberalism’s contemporary 
intellectual heirs—increasingly surrender to the allure of a tyrannical 
 
550. Extremists Use Coronavirus to Advance Racist, Conspiratorial Agendas, ADL (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.adl.org/blog/extremists-use-coronavirus-to-advance-racist-conspiratorial-agendas 
[https://perma.cc/9NKZ-98DL].  
551. SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 180 (quoting THE THIN 
RED LINE (20th Century Fox 1998)). 
552. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 4–5 (Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publ’g Co. 1973) (1951) (describing how a loss of influence and power, while retainment of 
wealth, attributed to the rise of anti-Semitism). 
553. Id. at 120. 
554. See id. at 3 (describing how the Nazis’ chief discovery and goal of persecuting Jewish people 
has since failed to have serious consideration throughout the world). 
555. See SMITH, ON THE ROAD WITH SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 11, at 182 (positing  
St. Augustine’s attribution of evil as a choice and voluntary in nature). 
556. See LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES, supra note 13, at 80–91 (explaining citizenship 
confers equality but not the other way around). 
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administrative state, unaccountable to democratic governance.  
Simultaneously, anti-Semitism permutes as university officials advance 
shibboleths in the face of hateful speech and proclaim their allegiance to the 
First Amendment rights of torch-bearing neo-Nazis.557  University officials 
are not alone in their capitulation; various groups, doubtlessly persuaded by 
free speech maximalists, urge the public to allow the torch-bearers’ 
protected speech to continue unabated.558  This failure to take neo-Nazis 
and others seriously ignores the linkage between discourse and violence and 
facilitates law-abiding citizens’ targeting by torch-bearers.559 
Although conflicting forces regarding speech coexist on campus, and 
while “colleges will always be a flashpoint in the larger cultural,” political, 
and social brawls enveloping our postmodern republic, limits endure.560  
Through academic freedom rules, public campuses can exercise content and 
viewpoint discrimination because all ideas are not equal.561  Additionally, 
academic freedom rules may play a role in restricting SJW disruptions, and 
divergencies remain between speech per se and harassment rising to the 
level of discriminatory conduct.562  Thus, pervasively discriminatory speech 
can be constrained.  Lastly, universities can avoid being trapped in simplistic 
understandings of the First Amendment.563  As a consequence, universities 
should no longer feel inert and powerless to fight anti-Semitism on campus. 
Avoidance of this trap furnishes a basis for restricting the rights of hate-
fueled torch-bearers who, given their unfathomable flight from reality, pose 
a clear and present danger to human life.  Avoidance rejects moderns’ 
infectiously Epicurean fondness for forgetting and helps us remember that 
the matrix, the indispensable condition for every other form of liberty “is 
not freedom of speech, but the right to live in peace, [free] from 
harassment.”564  Representing a small step that inverts the contemporary 
 
557. Loeffler, supra note 60 (describing how 300 neo-Nazis marched through a university while 
officials responded by adhering to First Amendment norms). 
558. See id. (explaining how various national Jewish organizations, though renouncing the 
display of anti-Semitism, urged for allowance of protected speech). 
559. See Olohan, supra note 314 (showing a linkage between discourse and violence as BDS 
advocates use Holocaust inversion techniques that portray Jews as Nazis). 
560. Healy, supra note 354, at 1082–83. 
561. Post, supra note 71, at 116. 
562. See, e.g., Goldfeder, supra note 56 (noting the Constitution protects speech not 
discriminatory harassment). 
563. See Loeffler, supra note 60 (stating how universities were a source of confusion on how to 
deal with torch-bearing neo-Nazis protesting on campus). 
564. Lasson, supra note 46, at 53–54 (declaring our unwavering commitment to the 
First Amendment may be undermining the democratic principles we are striving to protect). 
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elevation of individual rights at the expense of individual and collective 
responsibility, avoidance offers a tenuously affirmative answer to the 
question of whether this constitutional republic deserves to survive.  Lastly, 
responding to the fact that if we are honest, we should not be “in doubt 
about the direction in which the Good lies,”565 avoidance moves us toward 
becoming a nation that acknowledges limits, facilitates mutability within 
telos, pursues progress within boundaries, and acquiesces in the reality of 
imperfectability.566 
Possibly, these combined maneuvers may destabilize racial, ethnic, and 
religious tropes.  Although speech, in our late modern republic, may be a 
right, perhaps even a moral one enabling us to do wrong, still, within the 
context of a university or as a member of a university community, it is 
doubtful that right’s holders can do wrong with impunity.567 
  
 
565. MURDOCH, supra note 7, at 97. 
566. See, e.g., Patrick J. Deneen, Counterfeiting Conservatism, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Apr. 1, 2010, 
12:00 AM) https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/counterfeiting-conservatism/ 
[https://perma.cc/QX5Y-5FE6] (analyzing how conservative’s reactionary, as opposed to progressive, 
mindset has led to a radical shift in ideology). 
567. EDMUNDSON, supra note 4, at 193. 
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